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THE “IS” AND “OUGHT” OF VERTICAL 
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SPRAY-RITE SERVICE CORP.
John J. Flynn*
“[ OJur quest for certitude is so ardent that we pay an irrational reverence to 
a technique which uses symbols of certainty, even though experience again 
and again warns us that they are delusive. ”l
Great hopes and great fears accompanied the Supreme Court’s 
decision to review the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Spray-Rite Service 
Corp. v. Monsanto Co.2 Proponents o f  a neoclassical economic model 
o f antitrust analysis, including the Reagan administration, saw Mon­
santo as a vehicle for bringing coherence to the analysis o f  vertical 
market restraints. The neoclassicists hoped that the Monsanto Court 
would declare purely vertical price fixing per se lawful, or at least 
apply a rule o f  reason similar to the one applied to vertical divisions 
o f territories and customers after Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva­
nia Inc.3 Opponents o f  legalizing vertical price fixing, on the other 
hand, saw Monsanto as a serious challenge to their goal o f a rule o f  
per se illegality for vertical price fixing. The opponents included 
many members o f  Congress who thought that Congress had man­
dated per se illegality for vertical price fixing when it repealed the 
exemption for state fair trade laws.4 The Antitrust Division o f  the 
Department o f  Justice, however, favored legalizing vertical price fix­
ing, and it improperly sought to lead the charge by way o f a subse­
quently aborted amicus brief in the case.
Although the Supreme Court gave neither side a clear victory 
or defeat, it created significant ambiguity about central issues in ver­
tical price fixing litigation and other antitrust cases that were certain 
to follow.5 As with many other interpretations o f  important laws
* Hugh B. Brown Professor o f Law, College of Law, University o f Utah.
1 Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 644 n.40 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
2 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
3 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (measuring agreements between manufacturers and retailers 
restricting geographical retail sales areas by rule of reason standard).
4 Consumer Goods Pricing Act o f 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 3, 89 Stat. 801 
(1975) (deleting paragraphs of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) which permitted fair trade pricing of 
articles for retail sale and state enactment o f nonsigner provisions).
5 Professor Hay perceptively explored this result in Hay, Vertical Restraints After 
Monsanto, 70 C o r n e l l  L. R ev. 418 (1985); see also Floyd, Vertical Antitrust Conspiracies 
After Monsanto and Russell Stover, 33 U. K an. L. R ev. 269  (1985).
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during times o f  doctrinal or economic upheaval or following signifi­
cant changes in the Court’s membership, the Monsanto decision is 
not satisfying. Monsanto reflects deep problems with the Burger 
Court’s decision making. By using Monsanto and its progeny to illus­
trate problems with the Court’s values and methodology in analyz­
ing antitrust issues, this Article seeks to explore these deeper 
implications, for their significance for antitrust litigation reaches be­
yond vertical restraint cases.
Part 1 o f this Article examines Monsanto and the issues that deci­
sion left unresolved. Part II examines post -Monsanto lower court de­
cisions dealing with these open issues. Rather than attempting to 
reconcile these often contrary rulings, this survey demonstrates 
that, absent Supreme Court guidance, lower courts are reaching op­
posite conclusions on similar facts. Finally, Part III discusses the 
flaws o f the neoclassical approach to antitrust adjudication. The Ar­
ticle concludes that neoclassicists fail to respect the antitrust laws’ 
proper consideration o f social and political values and that courts 
adopting the neoclassical argument injudiciously invade the legisla­
ture’s role.
I
M o n s a n t o : I t s  L e g a l  a n d  D o c t r i n a l  S h o r t c o m i n g s
A. Unresolved Legal Issues
The Monsanto Court held that there was sufficient evidence at 
trial to find that Monsanto unlawfully terminated the plaintiff’s dis­
tributorship o f Monsanto herbicides.6 Specifically, the Court upheld 
the jury’s finding that Monsanto terminated the plaintiff, a price-cut­
ting distributor, “pursuant to a price-fixing conspiracy between 
Monsanto and its distributors”7 to fix the resale price o f Monsanto’s 
herbicides. The Court also found sufficient evidence o f a causal 
connection between the conspiracy to fix prices and the plaintiff’s 
antitrust injury to sustain a damage award under section 1 o f the 
Sherman Act.8 Beyond the scope o f the immediate controversy, 
however, the decision left at least four issues unresolved:
(1) whether the Court will continue to hold vertical price fixing a per 
se violation o f section 1 o f the Sherman Act; (2) what constitutes 
sufficient evidence to send to a jury the questions o f  whether there is 
a contract, combination or conspiracy to fix prices and whether that 
conspiracy caused antitrust injury to the plaintiff; (3) what conduct
6 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 767-68. Section 1 o f the Sherman Act prohibits “ [e]very contract, combi­
nation in the form of trust o r otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint o f trade or com­
merce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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can courts identify as price fixing within the meaning o f the per se 
rule prohibiting vertical price fixing; and (4) what factors identify 
conduct as horizontal or vertical for purposes o f analyzing distribu­
tion restraints under section 1 o f the Sherman Act?
The issue o f the per se status o f vertical price fixing remains 
unclear. Attempts by the Solicitor General and other amid to raise 
the issue before the Supreme Court were rejected because neither 
party had raised the issue in the courts below.9 Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence shed no light on this issue, but it underscored the ma­
jority opinion’s ambiguity with regard to the future status o f the per 
se rule against vertical price fixing. By stressing Congressional ac- 
quiesence to the rule o f Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &  Sons10 
and the majority’s “adhere[nce] to that rule,”11 Justice Brennan im­
plicitly suggested that the Court’s refusal to reconsider the per se 
rule fell short o f a ringing endorsement.
The second issue Monsanto left unclear deals with the evidence 
sufficient to prove contract, combination or conspiracy and a causal 
connection between the conspiracy and the plaintiff’s alleged anti­
trust injury. Instead o f providing criteria for future litigation, the 
Court’s legal analysis focused on rejecting appellate court dicta as­
serting that “proof o f termination following competitor complaints 
is sufficient to support an inference o f  concerted action.” 12 The 
Monsanto Court did find, however, sufficient evidence for the jury to 
infer a conspiracy from certain facts unique to this case.13 The 
Court’s naked identification o f  evidence sufficient in this case falls 
woefully short o f a general test for evidentiary sufficiency, leaving 
future courts to guess where the Court meant the line dividing 
judge and jury functions to fall.14
9 465 U.S. at 761 n.7.
K> 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
11 465 U.S. at 769 (Brennan, J., concurring).
12 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (7th Cir. 1982), 
ajf'd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
13 Specifically, the Court found sufficient evidence in the following: (1) competitor 
complaints plus efforts by Monsanto employees to coerce other price cutters into line 
(including communicating with one price cutter’s parent corporation to secure adher­
ence to Monsanto’s resale prices); (2) Monsanto’s failure to fill the plaintiff’s herbicide 
orders during the shipping season (when the product was in short supply) in order to 
force compliance with suggested prices; and (3) a distributor’s newsletter reporting a 
meeting with Monsanto officials who discussed efforts “ to get the market in order” and 
represented that Monsanto agreed not to undercut retailer prices in its own retail out­
lets. 465 U.S. at 765-66 & n.10.
14 Justice Powell, writing for the majority in the post -Monsanto decision of Matsu­
shita Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986), characterized Monsanto as 
holding that “ conduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspir­
acy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy.” Id. at 1357. 
This reading of Monsanto appears to increase the standard of proof for the conspiracy 
element o f the offense. In Monsanto the Court held that “ [t]here must be evidence that
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The Monsanto Court also neglected an opportunity to define 
more clearly the concept o f  “price fixing” prohibited by the per se 
rule. The Court refused to address the argument proffered by the 
Solicitor General as amicus that:
If a supplier adopts a bona fide distribution program that includes 
nonprice restraints and if that program is reasonably addressed to 
distribution problems, the case must be judged by the rule of rea­
son unless the plaintiff can show—by direct or circumstantial evi­
dence—an explicit agreement about the prices distributors are to 
charge.15
The Court sidestepped this question by noting that Monsanto had 
conceded the applicability o f  the per se rule if  nonprice restraints 
were found part o f  a price fixing conspiracy.16 The Court acknowl­
edged the difficulty o f  drawing a line between price and nonprice 
vertical restraints,17 but offered little guidance to help resolve the 
difficulty. Consequently, subsequent courts have had to answer 
questions such as: (1) whether the conduct at issue should be cate­
gorized as “price fixing” within the meaning o f the per se rule;
(2) whether the conduct fits some other per se category; or
(3) whether the conduct is some other form o f vertical restraint to 
be measured on a more generous, but undefined, rule o f reason 
basis.
The final issue left unresolved by Monsanto is the distinction be­
tween horizontal and vertical restraints. Monsanto implicitly raised 
this issue because Monsanto functioned as a dual distributor, selling 
its herbicides both to distributors and in its own retail outlets.18 
Although the Court did not make much o f this fact, the opinion 
does note that the plaintiff’s evidence to prove conspiracy included 
a distributor’s newsletter reporting Monsanto’s alleged agreement
tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors 
were acting independently.. . .  [T]he antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circum­
stantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others ‘had a 
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objec­
tive.’ ” 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 
F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)). T o the extent that Matsu­
shita held that one may use motivations in the neoclassical model’s hypothetical world to 
determine whether real-world evidence tends to prove a conscious commitment to a 
common scheme, the opinion goes considerably further than the Monsanto holding on 
the questions o f  what evidence is legally sufficient to prove conspiracy and whether the 
factual determination is one for court or jury.
15 Summary o f  Argument Before the Court, 52 U.S.L.W. 3448 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1983) 
(No. 82-914); see generally Comment, Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.: The Jus­
tice Department Challenges The Per Se Rule Against Resale Price Maintenance, 46 U. P i t t .  L. 
R e v . 171 (1984) (arguing that per se rule should govern legality o f  both vertical non­
price restraints and resale price maintenance plans).
16 465 U.S. at 759 n.6.
17 id. at 762.
18 See id. at 766.
HeinOnline -- 71 Cornell L. Rev, 1098 1985-86
1986] VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AFTER MONSANTO 1099
to set the price o f  Monsanto herbicides at its own retail outlets at or 
above the suggested retail price.19 Hence, one may argue that Mon­
santo is really a horizontal price fixing case involving a conspiracy 
among Monsanto’s retailers. This horizontal aspect o f  the case 
could be used to distinguish Monsanto from future cases in which the 
conspiracy is more clearly vertical.
B. Unresolved Doctrinal Issues
A more general problem lies at the heart o f  the Monsanto deci­
sion. The question o f how the moral or normative objectives o f  the 
relevant legal standards should inform the application o f  those stan­
dards underlies the resolution o f  any legal dispute. Stated another 
way, a court engaged in the application o f  a legal standard is also 
engaged in a complex series o f  “ought” decisions requiring a deter­
mination o f  the facts and rules relevant to the dispute.
The central paradox o f  legal reasoning is that whereas applica­
tion o f the appropriate rule presupposes knowledge o f  the relevant 
facts, determination o f  the relevancy o f  a given fact presupposes a 
knowledge o f  the appropriate rule. In addition, courts must inter­
pret the concepts invoked by the rules in light o f  the facts found 
relevant and decide how those concepts ought to apply in light o f  
the consequences such an interpretation will have in this and future 
cases. Unlike the deductive and mechanical application o f premises 
to facts in some forms o f economic analysis,20 legal analysis should 
explore the moral and factual assumptions hidden in premises. In­
formal logic, not deductive logic, constitutes the essence o f  legal 
reasoning. It is in this sense that concepts are tools o f  analysis in 
law and that every legal decision is unavoidably a moral decision—a 
question o f  “ought.”21
Different schools o f  antitrust thought disagree over the deeper 
social and economic values and objectives underlying the antitrust 
laws and how courts should bring those values to bear upon a spe­
cific dispute. Ought courts view antitrust solely as a means for 
achieving economic “efficiency,” as that concept has been variously 
defined,22 or ought they regard antitrust as invoking broader policy 
considerations encompassing additional economic, social and polit­
19 Id. a t 766 . .
20 See Mason, Some Negative Thoughts on Friedman’s Positive Economics, 3 J .P o s t  K eyne­
s ia n  E c o n . 235  (1980).
21 See F. C o h e n , E t h i c a l  S y s tem s a n d  L e g a l  I d e a l s  3-7 (1959).
22 The concept “efficiency” has been used to mean, among other things, “produc­
tive” efficiency and “allocative” efficiency. See, e.g., Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 H o f s t r a  
L. R ev . 485 (1980). Often the same author invokes first one, then another, and some­
times hybrid concepts o f efficiency when discussing antitrust policy. See Peritz, The Predic­
ament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination
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ical values?23 Judge Posner, a relentless advocate o f  the deductive 
logic methodology inherent in neoclassical economic analysis, 
summed up succinctly the consequences o f  the “economic effi­
ciency” approach in Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries24:
The welfare of a particular competitor who may be hurt as the 
result of some trade practice is the concern not of the federal anti- 
tmst laws, . . . but of state unfair competition law . . . .
The exclusion of competitors is cause for antitrust concern 
only if it impairs the health of the competitive process itself.25
One o f many difficulties with Posner’s position and such cliches as 
“the ‘antitrust laws . . .  were enacted for the protection o f  competition, 
not competitors,’ ”26 is that courts, including the Supreme Court, 
continue to grant antitrust relief in cases lacking any showing o f in­
jury to “competition” in Posner’s sense. Indeed, in the context o f  
per se violations courts assume an injury to competition even 
though the proof often shows only injury to a particular competitor.
If one adopts Posner’s view o f antitrust, and the libertarian con­
sequences its premises and rigid reliance upon deductive logic com­
pel, then proof o f  injury to competition in a relevant market, or even 
proof o f  a reduction in output,27 should be a prerequisite to a find­
ing o f  illegality for conduct currently classified as per se illegal.28
Argument, 1984 D u k e  L.J. 1205, 1287 (1984) (discussing confusion in Richard Posner’s 
writings concerning various meanings o f  “efficiency”).
23 Among the social or political values antitrust policy might invoke is ensuring that 
an individual’s or a firm’s success or failure be guaranteed by a competitive process free 
from unreasonable collective or unilateral acts o f  others, without regard for whether the 
challenged conduct necessarily injures competition by increasing price above marginal 
cost or reducing output. Professor Fox has defined the “qualitative” goals o f  antitrust 
policy: “There are four major historical goals o f  antitrust, and all should continue to be 
respected. These are: (1) dispersion o f  economic power, (2) freedom and opportunity 
to compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction o f  consumers, and (4) protection o f  the com­
petition process as market governor.” Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilib­
rium, 66 C o r n e l l  L. R e v . 1140, 1182 (1981); see also infra notes 219-27 and 
accompanying text.
24 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984).
25 Id. at 394.
26 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14 (1984) 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), opinion reflecting the 
Warren Court’s view that competition is dynamic, not static).
27 See Bork, Vertical Restraints: S c h w in n  Overruled, 1977 S u p . C t .  R e v . 171 (1977).
28 Judge Easterbrook, Judge Posner’s co-author o f  A n t i t r u s t :  C a s e s ,  E c o n o m ic  
N o t e s  a n d  O t h e r  M a t e r i a l s  (2d ed. 1981), adopted, or a least came close to adopting, 
such an approach in Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985). The 
case involved a horizontal division o f  product markets by the plaintiff/landlord, who ran 
an appliance business, and the defendant/tenant, who owned a building supply busi­
ness. Before plaintiff constructed a building to house both businesses, the parties nego­
tiated a covenant running with the land which restricted each o f  them from selling  
certain products carried by the other. When the tenant realized that the restriction pre­
vented it from running advertising for all o f  its stores on certain products because the 
products were not available in the store subject to the covenant, it advised the landlord
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Given this requirement and the other assumptions o f  the neoclassi­
cal model, very little collaborative conduct would be o f antitrust 
concern, with the possible exception o f horizontal price fixing by 
dominant firms. Even then, neoclassicists might claim that market 
forces would remedy the problem more efficiently than government 
interference through the legal process.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Continental T. V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc.,29 purported to reject the position asserted by the 
dissent below that social and political values are goals that courts 
are bound to protect in giving meaning to and applying the antitrust 
laws. Justice Powell observed that“ [com petitive economies have 
social and political as well as economic advantages, . . . but an anti­
trust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any ob­
jective benchmarks.”30 Justice Powell’s statement hardly represents 
a resounding rejection o f injecting social and economic values and 
broader economic goals into the interpretation o f antitrust con­
cepts, nor does it endorse a complete acceptance o f  limiting anti­
trust analysis to considerations o f  economic efficiency as defined by 
neoclassical economic analysis. Yet the statement, particularly when 
coupled with Justice Powell’s acknowledgment o f  “free rider” analy­
sis in Monsanto?1 is a sufficient endorsement o f  efficiency to raise 
several questions. Among other issues, Powell’s statement calls into 
question whether courts should require proof o f adverse market ef­
that it would no longer abide by the covenant. The tenant defended a suit to enforce the 
covenant by claiming that the covenant was an illegal division o f  markets, 776 F.2d at 
187-88, and therefore void under the Illinois Antitrust Act, I II . R e v . S t a t .  ch. 38, § 60 
(1975), a statute patterned after federal antitrust laws.
The case was removed to a federal district court which held the covenant an illegal 
horizontal division o f product markets. Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 1985-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 66,450 (N.D. 111.), rev’d, 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985). In the course of 
reversing the district court, Judge Easterbrook wrote:
Although federal law treats almost all contracts allocating products and 
markets as unlawful per se, . . . the per se rule is designed for “naked” 
restraints rather than agreements that facilitate productive activity. . . .
Cooperation is the basis o f productivity. It is necessary for people to 
cooperate in some respects before they may compete in others, and coop­
eration facilitates efficient production. . . . Antitrust law is designed to 
ensure an appropriate blend o f cooperation and competition, not to re­
quire all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment. When co­
operation contributes to productivity through integration o f efforts, the 
Rule o f Reason is the norm.
776 F.2d at 188 (citations omitted). Distinguishing “ancillary” from “naked” restraints, 
Judge Easterbrook found the restraint ancillary because the agreement was a coopera­
tive venture with “prospects for increasing output.” Id. at 190. He reasoned that a 
showing o f “market power” is required before such a restraint may be struck down. Id. 
at 191. Finding none, the court reversed the district court’s opinion that the horizontal 
restraint dividing markets was illegal. Id.
29 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
30 Id. at 53 n.21 (citations omitted).
31 465 U.S. at 762-63.
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fects in all section 1 cases, whether they should require proof o f a 
relevant market in all rule o f reason cases, whether the Supreme 
Court is preparing to abandon the per se rule against vertical price 
fixing, and whether trial courts should interpret the antitrust stan­
dards strictly to ensure that a restraint deemed illegal injures both 
consumers generally and targeted firms.
Judicial disagreement over the goals o f antitrust (the “oughts”) 
rumbles beneath the surface o f  post -Monsanto opinions. Indeed, 
Monsanto’s condemnation o f  vertical price fixing on a per se basis 
ensures perpetuation o f the ideological conflict. While the Monsanto 
majority held vertical price fixing illegal per se because such agree­
ments deprive dealers o f the ability to exercise judgment in “making 
independent pricing decisions,”32 it made no mention o f the plain­
tiff’s need to prove an injury to consumers by demonstrating that 
the manufacturer’s marketing strategy restricted output or fixed 
prices above marginal cost.
Judicial condemnation o f horizontal and other restraints on a 
per se basis, without proof o f  a relevant market and injury to compe­
tition in that market, suggests a judicial recognition that Congress 
intended the antitrust laws to serve goals other than preventing re­
ductions in output.33 The Monsanto Court’s failure to resolve this 
issue has spawned continuing ideological controversy over the goals 
o f antitrust and the identity and definition o f the elements o f  the per 
se and rule o f  reason standards—controversy which is reflected in 
the litigation following that case.
II
T h e  “ I s ”  o f  L o w e r  C o u r t  D e c i s i o n s  F o l l o w i n g  .
M o n s a n t o
By the first quarter o f 1986, over sixty reported antitrust deci­
sions and several unreported decisions had cited Monsanto. Perhaps 
a dozen other cases did not cite Monsanto directly but did involve 
vertical restraints relevant to the policies discussed therein. All 
these cases share a general characteristic, one that should surprise 
no one familiar with the Reagan administration’s antitrust ideology: 
none have been brought by the Antitrust Division o f the United 
States Department o f Justice.
Another striking feature o f these cases is that more than half 
have involved rulings on motions for summary judgment or directed
32 Id. at 762. Justice Powell also recognized the validity o f  a manufacturer’s control 
over “marketing strategy,” id., for his products in order to “assure an efficient distribu­
tion system,” id. at 763.
33 A dealer’s freedom to compete on the merits would be an example o f  an antitrust 
goal unrelated to output reduction. See Fox, supra note 23, at 1169.
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verdict in favor o f  defendants. In many o f  the summary judgment 
cases, courts cite precedent suggesting that summary judgment 
should rarely be granted in antitrust cases where intent and motive 
play a major role.34 Nevertheless, many o f the same courts grant, or 
affirm the granting of, the summary judgment motion. Judges often 
grant preliminary motions with little or no mention o f the constitu­
tional right to a jury trial on contested matters o f  fact or o f the Fed­
eral Rules o f Civil Procedure philosophy o f de-emphasizing 
pleadings. Indeed, judges frequently use preliminary motions in 
ways which suggest that code pleading has returned to federal 
courts in antitrust cases.35 Surprisingly, these particularly significant 
issues are little noticed in post -Monsanto litigation.36
The post -Monsanto decisions may be categorized according to 
the issues with which they deal: (1) the evidence sufficient to allow 
the fact-finder to infer the existence o f a conspiracy and whether the 
conspiracy caused antitrust injury;37 (2) whether the conspiratorial 
activity is price fixing or some other form o f per se illegal conduct;38 
and (3) whether the conduct involved is horizontal or vertical.39 Liti­
gation concerning these issues continues against the background 
controversy over the goals o f antitrust policy.
34 Lower courts regularly cite the standard set forth in Poller v. Columbia Broad­
casting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (“summary procedures should be used sparingly 
in complex litigation where motive and intent play leading roles”). See, e.g., Terry’s 
Floor Fashions Inc. v. Burlington Indus., 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Poller but 
granting summary judgm ent for defendant).
35 See, e.g., Mueller v. Rayon Consultants, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y.) (func­
tion o f pleading under Federal Rules o f Civil Procedure is to give fair notice o f  claim 
asserted, and no more), appeal denied, 271 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1959); see also Trebuhs Realty 
Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 12 F.R.D. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Shepard v. Popular Publica­
tions, 10 F.R.D. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
36 One could interpret Monsanto as dealing with the appropriate functions o f  judge 
and jury  in vertical restraint cases or even as an indirect endorsement o f the Federal 
Rules o f Civil Procedure’s notice pleading philosophy. These two issues supplement the 
question o f the character and degree o f evidence necessary to prove the elements o f an 
antitrust conspiracy involving vertical o r other restraints.
T he post -Monsanto cases share another general characteristic: former law profes­
sors are writing many o f the significant antitrust decisions. See Will v. Comprehensive 
Accounting Corp.,: 776 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.), cert, denied, 106 S. Ct. 
1659 (1986); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easter­
brook, J.); Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.) (Posner, 
J.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 
(7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.); Kartell v. Blue Shield o f Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.
1984) (Breyer.J.), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 (1985). Some o f these judges use the cases 
before them to criticize still-binding Supreme Court opinions in extensive dicta. The 
institutional constraints on a lower court judge, namely, following the decisions o f the 
Supreme Court and deferring to congressional purposes in enacting economic regula­
tion, apparently carry little weight with some o f the appointees from the academic ranks.
37 See infra notes 42-94 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 102-52 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 156-68 and accompanying text.
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A. Sufficiency o f  the Evidence to Infer Conspiracy
Following Monsanto, a plaintiff alleging a conspiracy in violation 
o f the antitrust laws must prove: (1) a “conscious commitment to a 
common scheme”; and (2) that the alleged conspiracy caused an an­
titrust injury to the plaintiff.40 Some o f the post-Monsanto cases were 
filed or tried prior to Monsanto, with motions or appeals argued after 
the Supreme Court’s decision. Hence, some o f these cases involve 
mere competitor complaints followed by termination o f the plaintiff 
and lack the additional “plus” necessary to prove a “conscious com­
mitment to a common scheme,” a “unity o f  purpose,” or a “meeting 
o f the minds.”41 Although courts usually dismiss such cases with a 
citation to Monsanto or the Colgate doctrine’s42 recognition o f  the 
right o f traders to unilaterally refuse to deal,43 some o f these cases 
present close questions as to whether there was sufficient evidence 
o f a “plus” to permit a jury to infer the existence o f a conspiracy.44 
Other decisions confuse the question o f whether there was any con-
40 See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 767.
41 See National Marine Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 
1985); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit de Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert, 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1513 (1986); McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. 
Pa. 1984).
42 Colgate provides:
In the absence o f  any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act 
does not restrict the long recognized right o f  a trader or manufacturer 
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own in­
dependent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, o f  
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he 
will refuse to sell.
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). For an argument that the 
Colgate doctrine should be abolished, see Andersen, The Antitrust Consequences of Manufac­
turer-Suggested Retail Prices—The Case For Presumptive Illegality, 54 W a s h . L. R e v . 763 
(1979); see also Note, A Definition of Agreement: Identifying Purely Unilateral Conduct in Vertical 
Price Restriction Cases, 19 V a l .  U.L. R e v . 766 (1985) (proposing motive as basis for distin­
guishing permissible vertical price restraints).
43 See, e.g., Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 
1985) (manufacturer’s unilateral decision to rearrange its distribution scheme does not 
violate § 1 o f  the Sherman Act); Landmark Dev. Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369, 
372 (9th Cir. 1985) (evidence o f  exchange o f  correspondence between manufacturer 
and complaining distributor too “highly ambiguous” to justify inference o f  agreement 
to fix prices). See also Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(insufficient evidence to infer conspiracy); Kartell v. Blue Shield o f  Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 
922 (1st Cir. 1984) (no conspiracy where entities are not competitors in same market 
and no independent decision-making was compromised), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 
(1985); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 617 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (same), aff'd, 
797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (same), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. 
Supp. 43 (D. Mass. 1984) (same).
44 See National Marine Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir.
1985); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit de Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d 
Cir. 1985).
HeinOnline -- 71 Cornell L. Rev, 1104 1985-86
1986] VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AFTER MONSANTO 1105
spiracy with that o f whether the conspiracy was one to “fix prices.”45 
Still other decisions dispose of the case on the ground o f insufficient 
evidence of a causal connection between the agreement to fix prices 
and antitrust injury to the plaintiff.46 None o f the opinions ade­
quately discuss whether such issues should be determined by the 
judge or the jury.
Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb47 presents a rare case in 
which the plaintiff had no difficulty proving a contract, combination, 
or conspiracy. The defendant newspaper publisher had contracts 
with its “independent contractor” distributors which fixed the maxi­
mum price at which they could resell its newspapers. Despite Judge 
Posner’s claim in another case that the rule o f Albrecht v. Herald Co.48 
condemning maximum resale price maintenance “is in doubt after 
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,”49 the Ninth Circuit in 
Northwest Publications found no indication that the Supreme Court 
had questioned Albrecht’s per se rule.50 The court went on to find, 
however, that the plaintiff had failed to show that the contract fixing 
maximum prices had caused it not to raise prices; the evidence in­
stead supported a finding that other market factors prevented plain­
tiff from raising prices.
Although the Northwest Publications court did not refer to Mon­
santo, its decision mirrors Monsanto’s two-step analysis.51 The Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion ignores, however, the issue o f whether such ques­
tions ought to be decided by a judge or a jury.
Other cases have focused on the first part o f the Monsanto con­
spiracy test, discussing the minimum level o f evidence required to 
send to the jury the question of whether there was a conscious com­
mitment to a common scheme. In National Marine Electronics Distribu­
tors, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,52 a mail-order distributor o f Raytheon’s 
marine electronics products claimed that Raytheon had conspired
45 See Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985); 
O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 (D.C. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792 
F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 
822 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff'd, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985).
46 Other cases have involved unusual fact patterns which produce equally unusual 
analyses. See Beutler Sheetmetal Works v. McMorgan & Co., 616 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. 
Cal. 1985) (absence o f  anticompetitive purpose by builders and lenders in acquiescing 
to “union-only” policy for mortgage funds from union trust fund justified dismissal o f  
complaint; trust fund could not be co-conspirator absent competition with nonunion  
subcontractors denied funding).
47 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985).
48 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
49 Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
5(> 752 F.2d at 475.
51 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
52 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985).
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with its regular distributors to terminate plaintiff’s distributorship. 
The evidence was unclear about whether dealer complaints were 
based on plaintiff’s pricing or lack of a service facility53 and whether 
the dealer complaints also included threats to discontinue dealing 
with Raytheon if it continued to do business with the plaintiff.54 
Raytheon countered the plaintiff’s claim by arguing that its termina­
tion of the plaintiff arose from an internal review resulting in a deci­
sion against selling through mail-order dealers. The district court 
directed a verdict for Raytheon on the ground that the plaintiff had 
failed to produce sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the ques­
tion of conspiracy. Citing Monsanto, the court of appeals affirmed, 
holding that there was a lack of evidence that Raytheon and its deal­
ers “schemed to terminate the plaintiff for the purpose of re­
straining price competition.”55 Citing evidence that the defendant 
dictated neither the plaintiff’s nor any of its other dealers’ prices, 
the court found the evidence insufficient to prove a conspiracy to 
restrain prices.
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, reaffirmed its finding of 
sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to withstand a motion for sum­
mary judgement in Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries,56 From 
1975 until 1979, the Public Service Company o f Colorado (PSC) 
had operated and subsidized a program whereby residential custom­
ers could upgrade the insulation of their homes. Participants could 
choose either PSC-approved brands of rockwool, fiberglass, or cel­
lulose insulation. The defendant, Rockwool Industries, sold the 
only brand of rockwool insulation so approved 57 The plaintiff in 
Black Gold claimed that the defendant had illegally tied the sale of 
blown rockwool insulation to the sale of rockwool insulation in batts 
and had engaged in a concerted refusal to deal58 in the fiberglass 
batt insulation. The court upheld the trial court’s directed verdict 
for the defendant on the plaintiff’s tying claim, but reversed the 
lower court’s directed verdict for the defendant on the plaintiff’s 
allegation of a concerted refusal to deal. The court of appeals found 
that the evidence demonstrated a firm policy of refusing to deal with 
buyers who refused to buy both forms of its insulation, that the de­
fendant had continued to deal with the plaintiff’s competitors who
53 Id. at 191-92.
54 Id. at 192. There was also evidence that Raytheon agreed to supply the plaintiff 
on the condition that the plaintiff not advertise its prices for certain Raytheon products 
in its catalogues. Id.
55 Id. at 192-93.
5 6  729 F.2d 676, reli'g denied, 732 F.2d 779 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 854 
(1984)). The Tenth Circuit issued its original opinion in Black Gold before the Supreme 
Court’s Monsanto decision; after Monsanto, the Tenth Circuit denied a rehearing.
57 729 F.2d 676, 679.
58 Id.
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purchased both forms o f insulation, and that the defendant had ter­
minated the plaintiff for refusing to do so.59 The court also found 
evidence from which a jury could infer that the defendant, by 
manipulating its prices, was aiding the plaintiff’s competitor to 
regain a customer lost to the plaintiff.60
In its opinion denying a rehearing after Monsanto, the Tenth 
Circuit reaffirmed its prior holding, citing a specific example of evi­
dence that the Monsanto Court deemed sufficient to permit inferring 
the existence o f a conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit stated:
Among other things, the [Monsanto'] Court noted that a threat to 
cut off a nonacquiescing distributor during a time when the prod­
uct is in short supply is probative evidence of concerted action 
because it permits a jury to conclude that the manufacturer 
“sought this agreement at a time when it was able to use supply as 
a lever to force compliance.”61
Post-Monsanto cases exhibit considerable disagreement over the de­
gree to which coercion can transform unilateral, and thus protected, 
conduct into conduct amounting to a “conscious commitment to a 
common scheme.” The Monsanto opinion expressly sanctions the 
announcement of a Colgate-type policy, that is, a unilateral refusal to 
deal with price cutters,62 even though this policy often causes the 
distributor to forego his or her independent pricing discretion. 
Although Monsanto sanctions such conduct when purely unilateral, it 
also suggests that coercion can constitute evidence of a “plus” from 
which, in addition to complaints and termination, a jury may infer a 
section 1 conspiracy.
Several lower courts faced with resolving this conflict held that 
finding coercion to follow a seller’s suggested prices allows a jury to 
find a price fixing conspiracy, either between the seller and the com­
plaining buyer or between the seller and others. In these cases, 
courts found that evidence of dealer complaints permitted an infer­
ence that the seller had agreed with the complaining dealers to ter­
minate the plaintiff.63 In one case, for example, the Tenth Circuit
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Black Gold, Ltd., 732 F.2d at 780 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 765 n.10); see also 
Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204 (N.D.I11. 1985) (refusing sum­
mary judgm ent where jury could infer conspiracy from competing distributor’s threats 
to manufacturer).
G-  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 (“A manufacturer o f  course generally has a right to 
deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently. . . . 
Under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its resale prices in advance and refuse to 
deal with those who fail to comply.”) (citations omitted).
(53 See, e.g.. World o f  Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir.
1985); Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985).
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stated that an agreement may be inferred in circumstances where 
the defendant has taken action “adverse to . . . [the plaintiff] as a 
means o f enforcing price fixing . . .  by showing that although he 
refused to acquiesce in the price fixing, other buyers agreed to the 
arrangement.”64 Other courts have held that a supplier engages in 
an illegal agreement where competing dealers have formed a hori­
zontal conspiracy to terminate the plaintiff and secured the sup­
plier’s acquiescence in the scheme.65 A sufficient basis for a fact­
finder to infer an agreement, even if not coercive, has also been  
found in meetings between a defendant prime contractor and labor 
unions followed by picketing o f a job site designed to cause the de­
fendant to cease dealing with a plaintiff subcontractor employing 
workers from different unions,66 and in termination o f a plaintiff 
due to recommendations or manipulation by a seller’s employees or 
agents who were acting independently as competitors o f the 
plaintiff.67
In a newspaper distributor case where an independent contrac- 
tor-distributor claimed that publication o f a suggested retail price to 
home subscribers, collection o f subscriber bills at the suggested re­
tail price, and promotions to home subscribers prevented it from 
exercising its independent pricing discretion, the court did not find 
sufficient coercion to allow finding an agreement. In Dunn v. Phoenix 
Newspapers, Inc.,68 the Ninth Circuit declined to follow the well- 
known Albrecht v. Herald Co. footnote69 suggesting that it was not a 
“frivolous contention” for Albrecht to claim a conspiracy between 
the newspaper and his customers to maintain maximum prices. The 
Ninth Circuit instead read Albrecht as holding not that there was a 
combination between the newspaper and Albrecht’s customers, but 
only that it was not “frivolous” to suggest the possibility. The court 
refused to find that customer complaints, plus the newspaper’s noti­
64 World o f  Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1475 (10th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 77 (1985).
65 See Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1985); Motive Parts 
Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985); Marco Holding Co. v. Lear 
Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. 111. 1985). But see National Marine Elec. Distribs., 
Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985).
66 James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1984).
67 See Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto Corp., 769 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(conspiracy between shoe marketer and its distributor who operated retail stores to cut 
off plaintiff for underpricing distributor); Malley-Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 
734 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir.) (conspiracy between insurance company, former vice-president, 
employee, and insurance agency established by vice-president through front while in 
insurance company’s employ to take over plaintiff’s agency by terminating its relation­
ship with defendant insurance company), cert, denied, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley- 
Duff & Assocs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
68 735 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1984).
69 390 U.S. 145, 150 n .6 (1968).
HeinOnline -- 71 Cornell L. Rev, 1108 1985-86
1986] VER TICAL RESTRAINTS AFTER MONSANTO 1109
fication to its customers o f  its suggested retail price, amounted to a 
coerced agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to main­
tain retail prices. The court noted that the defendants were free to 
charge whatever price they liked, although “the carriers might have 
blushed to explain to their customers why they charged more than 
the suggested subscription prices.”70
The Sixth Circuit found coercion sufficient to allow a jury to 
infer agreement where a franchiser imposed unreasonable 
paperwork requirements on a franchisee as part o f a scheme 
designed to force franchisees to buy from sources and sell at prices 
determined by the franchiser. In Bender v. Southland Corp.,11 the 
court found that the franchiser’s “7-Eleven” franchisee “Retail Ac­
counting System” could be seen as an attempt to coerce franchisee 
compliance72 and therefore reversed the district court’s grant o f  
summary judgment for the defendant. In addition to the paperwork 
burden, the court relied on evidence o f  special surveillance o f  the 
plaintiff’s accounts, threats to terminate the plaintiff, refusal to 
honor the plaintiff’s price change reports resulting in inventory 
shortages chargeable to plaintiff, delayed payroll payment from 
funds withheld from the franchisee for that purpose, and visits by 
Southland employees demanding that the plaintiff raise prices on 
items sold below the defendant’s suggested price.73 Defining 
“[c]oercion in the vertical price fixing context” as “actual or 
threatened affirmative action beyond suggestion or persuasion, 
taken by a defendant in order to induce a plaintiff to follow the 
defendants’ prices,”74 the court found sufficient evidence o f  a co­
erced agreement to merit a trial.
The Ninth Circuit, relying on its pre-Monsanto decision in Filco 
v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.75 has taken a somewhat different ap­
proach to coercion. In Filco the court held that competitor com­
plaints, followed by termination, are insufficient evidence from 
which to infer agreement.76 Instead, a plaintiff must show concerted 
action and an attempt to coerce the plaintiff to abide by suggested 
prices in order to reach the jury. In addition, the Ninth Circuit held 
that plaintiffs may establish the element o f  causation by evidence of: 
(1) the volume and intensity o f  complaints; (2) the time gap between 
receipt o f  the complaints and termination; and (3) whether the de­
70 735 F.2d at 1187.
7 * 749 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1984).
72 T he defendant’s system imposed extensive reporting requirements which the de­
fendant failed to explain adequately. See id. at 1200-10, 1212-14.
73 Id. at 1212-13.
74 Id. at 1213.
75 709 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.), cert, dismissed, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
76 Id. at 1263.
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fendant had a valid, independent reason for the termination.77
Subsequent courts have used elements o f  Filco’s three-part 
causal test to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to send 
the conspiracy question to the jury. In particular, courts have fo­
cused on whether a defendant had a business reason for terminating 
a distributor, whether a conspiracy was one to fix prices,78 and 
whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence o f  causation.79 
Finding a good business reason, such as the defendant’s undertak­
ing an independent study o f changing its marketing system in a way 
which the plaintiff claims caused termination, has sufficed to refute 
a claim o f a dealer-supplier conspiracy to terminate the plaintiff.80 
Similarly, courts have deemed vertical conduct required by govern­
ment regulation a sufficient business reason to defeat a conspiracy 
claim.81
In one case, however, where the plaintiff demonstrated that the 
defendants’ claimed business justification was factually unsupported 
or highly questionable, the court chose to send the question o f  con­
spiracy to the jury. In Fragale &  Sons Beverage v. Dill,82 two independ­
ent wholesalers promised to supply a retailer taking over a beer 
outlet in Cameron County, Pennsylvania, only to change their minds 
and refuse to deal with the plaintiff later.83 The plaintiff proved that 
the defendant wholesalers had met with the only other beer distrib­
utor in the county just prior to notifying the plaintiff that they would 
not supply his business.84 The defendants claimed that they refused 
to deal with the plaintiff because they had made independent busi­
ness decisions that Cameron County was too small to support two 
distributors, that the plaintiff’s demand was too small to justify the 
paperwork, and that the plaintiff was inexperienced in the business
77 Id. at 1264. The court noted, “Although none o f  these factors alone would be 
strong evidence o f  illegal concerted action, a combination o f  them could provide the 
necessary nexus between complaints and termination and at least allow the plaintiff to 
present his case to the jury.” Id. at 1265.
78 See Barnes v. Arden Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1985); O.S.C. Corp. v. 
Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.
1986); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Cal. 1984), 
aff'd, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985).
79 See Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Landmark Dev. Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43 (D. Mass. 1984).
80 See Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Co. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Cal. 
1984), aff'd, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. 
Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986).
81 See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
82 760 F.2d 469 (3d Cir. 1985).
83 Id. at 471.
84 id. at 474.
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o f beer retailing.85 The plaintiff contested these claims with evi­
dence that the defendants served smaller areas than Cameron 
County and smaller accounts than his. The court noted that the 
“opportunity to conspire,” by itself, was insufficient evidence to 
prove conspiracy, but concluded that a jury could infer a conspiracy 
where the opportunity to conspire closely preceded the defendants’ 
repudiation o f  the agreement to deal.86 Taking the evidence o f op­
portunity to conspire with the plaintiff’s evidence undermining the 
defendants’ supposed business purpose, the court found sufficient 
justification for allowing a jury to hear the case.87
As noted above, one court concluded that the defendant’s inju­
rious conduct was excused and withheld the question o f conspiracy 
or causation from the jury where the defendant engaged in that con­
duct in order to comply with government regulations. In Barnes v. 
Arden Mayfair, Inc.,88 the developer o f a new method for sterilizing 
milk to increase its shelf life claimed that several Alaskan dairies and 
a shipper had conspired to exclude its product from the Alaskan 
market. The plaintiff’s suit against the shipper89 rested on the the­
ory that the shipper had raised its rates at the dairies’ insistence.90 
The shipper conceded that it had increased the plaintiff’s shipping 
rates in response to dairies’ complaints that the product was being 
shipped under the wrong Interstate Commerce Commission rate.
The court held that because the Interstate Commerce Act man­
dated the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff failed to produce spe­
cific evidence o f conspiracy.91 In so holding, the court reiterated 
the Ninth Circuit’s test for evaluating summary judgment motions in 
antitrust conspiracy cases: “Once the allegations o f conspiracy made 
in the complaint are rebutted by probative evidence supporting an 
alternative interpretation o f a defendant’s conduct, if  the plaintiff 
then fails to come forward with specific factual support o f its allega­
tions o f conspiracy, summary judgment for the defendant becomes 
proper.”92 This standard seems consistent with Monsanto’s require­
ment o f  “evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the 
manufacturer and non terminated distributors were acting indepen­
dently”93 and the requirement o f  “direct or circumstantial evidence
85 id. at 471-72.
86 id. at 474.
87 Id.
88 759 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1985).
89 T he plaintiff settled its dispute with the dairies. Id. at 678.
9 °  Id. at 681-83.
9 !  Id. at 682-84.
92 759 F.2d at 680 (quoting ALW, Inc. v. United Air Lines, 510 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 
1975)).
93 465 U.S. at 764.
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that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others 
‘had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to 
achieve an unlawful objective.’ ”94 To the extent that such stan­
dards apply at the motion stage o f  litigation, however, they appear 
to be devices o f  code pleading that could seriously curb the antitrust 
plaintiff’s right to a jury trial on the question o f  conspiracy.
B. Whether the Conduct Is Price Fixing or Some Other Form 
o f Per Se Illegal Activity
In Monsanto the Court acknowledged the difficulty in distributor 
termination cases o f  applying the distinction between concerted ac­
tion to set prices and concerted action on nonprice restrictions.95 
Unfortunately, the Court provided even less guidance on this issue 
than on the question o f  whether evidence o f conspiracy is sufficient 
to send a case to a jury. Post -Monsanto litigation has grappled with 
this problem by asking two fundamental questions: (1) whether the 
facts as presented support a conspiracy to fix prices or merely indi­
cate joint conduct for some other purpose;96 and (2) whether the 
claimed conspiracy constitutes per se illegal price fixing or is some 
other activity which is or ought to be considered per se illegal.
The majority opinion in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
94 Id. (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d 
Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
95 465 U.S. at 762 (noting “similar or identical” economic effects).
96 Many o f  the cases finding a business justification by suggesting that a defendant’s 
conduct is unilateral and thereby rebuts evidence o f  a conspiracy, could also have been  
decided on the ground that the conduct involved was not for the purpose o f  fixing 
prices. For example, in Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43 (D. Mass. 1984), the defend­
ant furniture supplier inquired o f  its southern dealers where the plaintiff catalog seller 
was obtaining the defendant’s furniture for resale. T he defendant sold its furniture only 
through authorized dealers whose franchise agreements contained location restrictions. 
The court dismissed the case for lack o f  conspiracy and causation, but might have 
achieved a similar result on the ground that the defendant was exercising a GTE Sylvania, 
433 U.S. 36 (1977), right to enforce its location clause.
The Ninth Circuit could have reached a similar result in Landmark Development 
Corp. v. Chambers Corp., 752 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1985). The Landmark plaintiff obtained 
large quantities o f  defendant’s appliances by claiming they would be installed in modu­
lar housing destined for Alaska. The plaintiff instead sold the appliances at retail in 
California markets where the defendant had established exclusive distributorship. Upon 
discovering the scheme, the defendant terminated sales to the plaintiff. Although the 
court relied upon a business justification theory, it could also have decided the case on 
the ground that the defendant was exercising its GTE Sylvania right to restrict the distri­
bution o f  its product by territorial exclusivity clauses or customer restraints.
Substituting a GTE Sylvania analysis for the business justification rule, however, 
would raise additional questions. A court might face the issue o f  whether a vertical re­
fusal to deal for purposes other than price fixing ought to be categorized as a per se 
illegal boycott. Alternatively, a court might have to decide what factors a plaintiff must 
prove to demonstrate that a vertical restraint is unreasonable under the rule o f  reason. 
For discussion o f  these questions, see infra notes 230-42 and accompanying text.
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Radio Corp.,9"7 a post -Monsanto Supreme Court decision involving al­
legations o f a horizontal conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing, 
appears to sanction such an approach. In Matsushita, the plaintiff 
charged that manufacturers and sellers of consumer electronics 
products in Japan conspired to exclude others from the American 
market by raising prices in Japan to subsidize low prices for their 
exports to the United States. The district court dismissed the com­
plaint on a summary judgment motion, finding insufficient evidence 
of conspiracy to sustain the antitrust claim; the Third Circuit re­
versed after determining that the trial court had improperly ex­
cluded much o f the evidence.98 The Supreme Court relied upon the 
neoclassical economic model, which dictates that predatory pricing 
is “economically irrational,” “practically infeasible,” “inherently un­
certain,” and “speculative,”99 and noted that “[t]he alleged conspir­
acy’s failure to achieve its ends in the two decades of its asserted 
operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact ex­
ist.”100 The Court remanded the case to the Third Circuit to con­
sider the summary judgment in light o f other evidence.101 The 
majority’s reasoning threatens to limit significantly the number of 
antitrust cases that will go to the jury by encouraging the use of 
motions to bring factual issues to the judge before meaningful dis­
covery takes place.
Various factors seem to affect a court’s characterization o f the 
defendant’s actions. Cases finding price fixing usually contain evi­
dence that the plaintiff was cutting prices, that the defendant’s mo­
tive for the termination was the plaintiff’s pricing, or that competing 
dealers complained about the plaintiff’s pricing practices.102 On the 
other hand, sound business justifications or circumstances indicat­
ing that the defendant was attempting to exercise GTE Sylvania- 
sanctioned vertical restraints without the taint o f a motive or intent 
to fix prices have moved courts to hold that a jury could not classify 
the restraint as price fixing, thus allowing the courts to dismiss 
complaints.103
Several courts, following the rule enunciated in Cemuto, Inc. v. 
United Cabinet Corp.,104 have held that where a supplier cuts off a dis­
97 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
Id. at 1351-53.
99 Id. at 1357.
100 Id. at 1359.
101 Id. at 1362.
102 See cases cited supra notes 63 & 65.
103 See, e.g., Moffat v. Lane Co., 595 F. Supp. 43 (D. Mass. 1984); O.S.C. Corp. v. 
Apple Computer, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir.
1986); Computer Place, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 607 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Cal. 1984), 
aff'd, 779 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1985).
104 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Victorian House, Inc. v. Fisher Camuto
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tributor at a competing distributor’s request, the supplier commits a 
per se violation o f the antitrust laws. The Cemuto rule, however, is 
seemingly inconsistent with the “termination plus” requirement o f  
Monsanto. Courts now seeking to determine whether a supplier that 
terminates a price-cutting dealer at the insistence o f a competing 
dealer is engaged in per se illegal price fixing have encountered dif­
ficulties reconciling the two cases.
The Fifth Circuit in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics 
Corp.105 reached an opposite conclusion from that in Cemuto. In 
Business Electronics Corp. the court held it erroneous to instruct a jury 
that it could find per se price fixing solely on the basis o f facts simi­
lar to those in Cemuto. In language indicating that the Fifth Circuit 
ascribed unique meaning to “price fixing,” the court asserted that 
“[a]n agreement to terminate a price cutter does not fix prices at any 
specific or general level but merely frees the complaining dealer to 
set prices as he chooses.”106 The court then recognized that, under 
Monsanto, dealer complaints followed by termination are not suffi­
cient to prove conspiracy and that courts must take care when draw­
ing the line between vertical price fixing and other types o f vertical 
restraints in determining whether a per se rule should be fol­
lowed.107 Ultimately, the court concluded that
in order for a manufacturer’s termination of a distributor to be 
illegal per se, it must be pursuant to a price maintenance agree­
ment with another distributor. That distributor must expressly or 
impliedly agree to set its prices at some level, though not a spe­
cific one. The distributor cannot retain complete freedom to set 
whatever price it chooses.108
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Business Electronics Corp. badly dis­
torted the Monsanto analysis. The Monsanto Court nowhere required 
that a plaintiff prove the existence o f a contract between the supplier 
and the complaining dealer to maintain prices “at some level” re­
sulting in the price-cutting dealer’s termination before allowing a 
jury to find illegal price fixing. Concededly, Monsanto does require 
proof o f a causal connection between an agreement to maintain 
prices and the cut-off o f a dealer before the dealer can prove anti­
Corp., 769 F.2d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 1985) (“A conspiracy between a wholesaler and one 
or more o f  its retailers to terminate a competing retailer on the basis o f  price constitutes 
a per se violation o f  the Sherman Act.”); Zidell Explorations, Inc. v. Conval Int’l, Ltd., 
719 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
l° 5  780 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986). 
l ° 6 Id. at 1216.
107 T he Fifth Circuit’s confusing discussion leaves unclear whether the court con­
cluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to send the case to a jury on the ques­
tion o f  conspiracy or that the evidence would not support a jury finding o f  price fixing. 
Id.
•°8  Id. at 1218.
HeinOnline -- 71 Cornell L. Rev, 1114 1985-86
1986] VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AFTER MONSANTO 1115
trust injury.109 The Fifth Circuit, however, overstated this 
requirement.
The Business Electronics Corp. court’s interpretation o f Monsanto 
likely reflects a belief that vertical price fixing ought not be per se 
illegal. Judge Jones explicidy asserted this position in her concur­
rence. Although Judge Jones has not been appointed to the 
Supreme Court or elected to Congress, she apparently felt no con­
straint in claiming that the case “perfecdy illustrates the arguments 
why vertical price restraints should be tested under antitrust’s Rule 
o f Reason,” 110 that the “flaws in Monsanto's continued recognition 
o f per se illegality are highlighted by this case,”111 and that the 
“Supreme Court should take the earliest opportunity to review its 
Russian roulette approach to vertical price restraints.” 112
A more difficult variation o f the problem o f distinguishing price 
fixing activity from protected joint conduct arises where either the 
supplier’s motive or the effect on price are less direct than in the 
case o f a discounter terminated pursuant to an agreement with a 
competing distributor. For example, is it price fixing for a supplier 
to reduce its wholesale price through a “sales assistance” program 
in order to help a dealer meet price competition on a specific sale? 
Some appellate courts upheld such programs prior to Monsanto, not­
ing that they were essentially procompetitive because they allowed 
the dealer to engage in price competition.113 Similarly, in one post- 
Monsanto case, Bryant Heating &  Air Conditioning Corp. v. Carrier 
Corp.,114 a district court found that a supplier’s sales assistance pro­
gram did not constitute a price fixing agreement because it did not 
“have the effect o f depriving the dealer o f pricing freedom, but in­
stead sought only to ensure that the discount be passed on to the 
customer.” 115
109 465 U.S. at 767. (“I f . . . there was evidence o f  an agreement with one or more 
distributors to maintain prices, the remaining question is whether the termination o f  
Spray-Rite was part o f  or pursuant to that agreement.”).
110 780 F.2d at 1221 (Jones, J., concurring).
" 1  Id.
112 Id. at 1222 (Jones, J., concurring).
113 See Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 714 F.2d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 
1982), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984); AAA Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, 
705 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 919 (1983).
114 597 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Fla. 1984); see also Jack Walters & Sons v. Morton BIdg., 
Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1984) (post-Moiisanto case stating that sales assist­
ance programs do not necessarily violate the Sherman Act), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1018 
(1984).
115 597 F. Supp. at 1051. T he court further supported its conclusion that no price 
fixing had occurred by noting that the dealer had initiated the reduction in price, that 
the manufacturer had never refused to sell because o f  the dealer’s pricing policies, and 
that the manufacturer had never threatened to terminate the dealer over a pricing dis­
pute. Id.
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More controversially, the First Circuit found no price fixing as a 
matter o f law in Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts.116 There, the 
court scrutinized Blue Shield’s full service health insurance program 
allowing subscribers to see any doctor who signed a participating 
physician’s agreement with Blue Shield. Under that contract, the 
doctor agreed to accept as payment in full for his services an 
amount Blue Shield determined under its formula for ascertaining 
customary charges. The plaintiff doctors claimed the plan consti­
tuted unlawful price fixing under section 1 o f  the Sherman Act, as 
well as unlawful monopolization and an attempt to monopolize 
under section 2 o f the Act.117 The district court accepted the plain­
tiffs’ section 1 claim, finding that the plan unreasonably restrained 
competition because the payment method, when coupled with Blue 
Shield’s size and economic power,118 produced unreasonably rigid 
and low prices, interfered with the doctors’ freedom to set the price 
o f their services, and deterred doctors from offering better and 
more expensive services.119
The First Circuit reversed, holding that “from a commercial 
perspective, Blue Shield in essence ‘buys’ medical services for the 
account o f others” 120 and that a buyer is entitled to bargain over a 
purchase’s essential terms; even a monopoly buyer “is entitled to 
use its market power to keep prices down.” 121 The court thus held 
that the conduct did not constitute price fixing, an unreasonable re­
straint o f  trade, or a section 2 violation. The court’s finding that 
Blue Shield was a “buyer” for its third party subscribers played a 
crucial role in the decision. The court’s analogies to the relation­
ships o f a father buying a toy his son picks out, a landlord hiring a 
painter to paint his tenant’s apartment in accord with the tenant’s 
specification, or an employer hiring a doctor to treat its employ­
ees,122 however, are somewhat limp. For example, a patient who 
buys doctor services normally selects the doctor-seller o f the serv­
ices, while the insurer agrees to pay the bill or reimburse the pa­
tient. Moreover, whereas most health care insurance claims involve 
just one contract, Blue Shield’s plan contained three: the agree­
ment between doctor and patient, the agreement between patient
116 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 (1985).
117 Section 2 o f  the Sherman Act deems guilty o f  a felony “[e]very person who shall 
monopolize, or attem pt. . .  or combine or conspire with any other person . . .  to monop­
olize . . . trade or commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
118 T he district court found that Blue Shield insured 56%  o f  the Massachusetts pop­
ulation (45%  under the balance billing plan) and accounted for 74%  o f  the privately 
insured population o f  Massachusetts. 749 F.2d at 924.
•19 Id.
120 id. at 925.
121 Id. at 929.
122 id. at 925.
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and insurer, and the agreement between doctor and insurer. Thus, 
Kartell raises a serious question as to whether normal assumptions 
about the competitive process apply in a market where third party 
reimbursement might distort the normal incentives o f  buyers and 
sellers o f  the service.
Regardless o f whether these distinctions merit a different result 
from the one reached, the court should have acknowledged them. 
Instead, the court simply held:
The relevant antitrust facts are that Blue Shield pays the bill and 
seeks to set the amount of the charge. Those facts led other courts 
in similar circumstances to treat insurers as if they were ‘buyers’.
The same facts convince us that Blue Shield’s activities here are 
like those of a buyer.123
From this basic finding, it followed that the prices set by Blue Shield 
were not unlawful unless predatory;124 that as a buyer, Blue Shield 
had a right to refuse to deal so long as it acted unilaterally;125 and 
that Blue Shield’s ban on balance billing was a lawful part o f  the 
bargain.126
Kartell illustrates the significance o f  the assumptions one makes 
about the policy goals underlying antitrust laws. Those who see the 
purpose o f  antitrust as promoting “consumer welfare,” as defined 
by neoclassical economic analysis, would probably agree with the 
Kartell Court’s analysis because the Blue Shield plan created lower 
prices for consumers. However, the decision will likely trouble 
those who view the antitrust laws as securing broader goals such as 
guaranteeing the independence o f  entrepreneurs or preventing pri­
vate power centers from exercising undue “governmental” power. 
Blue Shield’s plan interfered with both the pricing discretion o f doc­
tors and the freedom o f subscribers and took on the trappings o f  
rate regulation—a power normally exercised by government.
The Kartell court, rather than grappling with the facts in light o f  
the assumptions underlying the model, ultimately redefined the 
facts to fit that model. In the absence o f a constructive legislative 
response to the market forces’ failure to handle the problems o f  de­
livering health care services, the court was confronted with a diffi­
cult choice between conferring excessive market power on either 
insurers or doctors. Confronting the real dimensions o f  the choice 
would reveal that although antitrust policy cannot resolve all market 
imperfections, an unrealistically abstract laissez faire approach does 
little better.
123 Id. at 926 (emphasis in original).
124 Id. at 927-28.
125 Id. at 932.
126 Id. at 929-30.
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Judge Posner’s opinion in Jack Walters &  Sons v. Morton Building, 
Inc.127 illustrates the significance o f  both a judge’s assumptions 
about the policy underlying antitrust laws and the ideology he or 
she brings to the process o f  determining whether conduct should be 
legally categorized as price fixing. In that case, a terminated fran­
chisee o f  prefabricated buildings claimed that its franchiser had ille­
gally imposed a tying arrangement and resale price maintenance 
agreement. In a lengthy and dicta-laden opinion, Judge Posner up­
held the district court’s partial grant o f  summary judgment for the 
defendant. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner found 
that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence o f two separate 
products as required to sustain a tying claim. The plaintiff further 
argued that the defendant had fixed prices by advertising special 
deals on its buildings to consumers and providing sales assistance to 
enable its dealers to sell at the advertised price; this claim also failed 
to move the court. It held that because the defendant’s advertising 
program was lawful, steps taken to insure that dealers passed along 
wholesale price concessions to consumers did not constitute vertical 
price fixing. Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff could not 
prove antitrust injury even if  it could show a conspiracy to fix prices. 
Competing dealers could always harm the plaintiff by selling at 
lower prices; the court stated that the plaintiff “will not be heard to 
complain about having to meet lawful price competition, which anti­
trust law seeks to encourage.”128
In his concurring opinion, Judge Swygert justifiably objected to 
Judge Posner’s extensive dicta.129 Nevertheless, Judge Posner used 
this case to question the validity and continued vitality o f the prohi­
bition against vertical maximum price fixing. Although admitting it 
was “premature” to “explore this maze further,”130 Judge Posner 
wrote that “ [i]t is minimum price fixing that creates the analogy to a 
dealers’ cartel upon which the per se rule against resale price main­
tenance rests.” 131 Reasoning that the Supreme Court held maxi­
mum price fixing illegal in Albrecht v. Herald Co.132 because the 
exclusive territories in that case were illegal under the rule o f United
127 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
128 737 F.2d at 709.
129 Id. at 713-14. In Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 
1984), an exclusive dealing case, Judge Posner vacated a preliminary injunction by over­
ruling the trial court’s finding o f  irreparable injury and holding that the law o f  exclusive 
dealing required application o f  a rule o f  reason rather than the strict test o f  Standard Oil 
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Judge Swygert dissented strongly, claiming that 
Judge Posner improperly second-guessed the trial judge and failed to apply the appro­
priate legal standards. Id. at 396-97 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
is o  737 p.2d at 707.
131 Id. at 706.
132 390 U.S. 145 (1968). •
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States v. Arnold, Schwinn &  Co.,133 Judge Posner concluded that the 
Court’s GTE Sylvania decision overruling Schwinn’s per se rule 
against vertical territorial restrictions undermined the Albrecht hold­
ing.134 Judge Posner further concluded that if  exclusive territories 
are lawful, then a franchiser should be allowed to set maximum 
prices for dealers within exclusive territories to prevent franchisee 
monopoly pricing.
This dicta-laden analysis ultimately concludes that vertical max­
imum price fixing agreements are not price fixing within the per se 
rule.135 The conclusion is based on the premises o f neoclassical 
economic analysis and conflicts with the position o f  those who main­
tain that the antitrust laws were designed to promote and ought to 
be interpreted as promoting goals broader than those recognized by 
Judge Posner’s ideology.
The conflict over the goals o f  antitrust policy becomes even 
more apparent in post -Monsanto litigation concerned with the extent 
to which vertical restraints unassociated with price fixing ought to 
fall within some category o f per se analysis. The legal status o f  boy­
cotts provides an example o f this conflict. In a Seventh Circuit case 
decided before Monsanto, Products Liability Insurance Agency v. Crura &  
Forster Insurance Cos.,136 Judge Posner concluded in dicta that a verti­
cally induced refusal to deal is not per se unlawful absent a purpose 
to fix prices.137 Without intent to fix prices, Judge Posner stated, 
“the plaintiff must show that the refusal to deal is likely to reduce 
competition.”138 Judge Posner then attacked the plaintiff’s claim 
that Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.139 established a rule that
133 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
134 See Morton Bldg., 737 F.2d at 706-07.
135 But see Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985) (find­
ing vitality in Supreme Court precedents holding maximum price fixing per se illegal).
136 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding grant o f  summary judgm ent for defend­
ant on ground that plaintiff foiled to present evidence o f  conspiracy).
137 Id. at 663. Judge Posner’s colleagues on the Fifth Circuit have more openly ap­
plied neoclassical economic theories to the issue o f  concerted refusals to deal, albeit in a 
case involving a price fixing claim. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 
F.2d 1212 (5th Cir. 1986); see also supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
138 682 F.2d at 663.
139  359  U.S. 207, 213 (1959) (h o ld in g  g r o u p  b o y c o t t  p e r  s e  il le g a l e v e n  th o u g h  “ th e  
v ic tim  is j u s t  o n e  m e r c h a n t  w h o s e  b u s in e s s  is so  sm a ll th a t  h is  d e s t ru c t io n  m a k e s  l i t t le  
d if fe re n c e  to  th e  e c o n o m y ”  ( fo o tn o te  o m it te d ) ) .
In United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), the Supreme Court 
held a vertically induced boycott o f  discount car dealers per se unlawful. T he Court 
reaffirmed its Klor’s opinion:
The principle o f  these cases is that where businessmen concert their 
actions in order to deprive others o f  access to merchandise which the 
latter wish to sell to the public, we need not inquire into the economic 
motivation underlying their conduct. Exclusion o f  traders from the mar­
ket by means o f  combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the 
free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to be 
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injury to any competitor could violate the antitrust laws even if  the 
action did not reduce competition. Judge Posner questioned the 
continuing validity o f  Klor’s’ protection o f individual competitors140 
and asserted that even if  Klor’s was still good law, the plaintiff had 
failed to show that “his exclusion [from the market] will turn out to 
have been the first step in a march toward [the] monopoly” 141 that 
the Klor’s Court feared.
The Monsanto Court’s implicit recognition that the antitrust 
laws seek to protect traders’ freedom to sell in accordance with their 
own judgment suggests that Klor’s is not the relic that Judge Pos­
ner’s dicta claims. Nor can his claim that a victim must prove that 
the boycott is the “first step in a march toward . . . monopoly” 142 o f  
some relevant market withstand scmtiny. Indeed, the Third Circuit 
continues to respect Klor’s and the goal o f protecting the traders’ 
freedom and has explicitly rejected Judge Posner’s view that non­
price vertical boycotts are not per se illegal.
In Malley-Duff &  Associates v. Crown Life Insurance Co.,143 an insur­
ance agency showed that the defendant insurance company termi­
nated its contract as the result o f  a conspiracy between the 
defendant’s former vice-president and another employee. As part 
o f the conspiracy, the individual defendants, while in the employ o f  
the insurance company, secretly set up a front agency for the pur­
pose o f taking over the plaintiff’s territory. The defendants then 
caused the insurance company to extend credit to their front agency 
and used their corporate positions to impose unreasonable quotas 
on the plaintiff’s agency. When the plaintiff failed to meet these 
quotas, the individual defendants, as employees o f  the insurance 
company, terminated the plaintiff’s agency relationship. They then 
transferred the plaintiff’s business to their own agency and resigned 
from the insurance company to work for their new agency.144 De­
spite these facts, the district court relied on Judge Posner’s dicta in 
Product’s Liability Insurance Agency145 to dismiss the complaint, believ­
saved by reference to the need for preserving the collaborators’ profit 
margins or their system for distributing automobiles.
Id. at 146 (citations omitted).
140 682 F.2d at 665.
141 Id.
>42 Id.
143  734 p.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert, denied. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & As- 
socs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); see also Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770 F.2d 
367 (3d Cir. 1985) (no antitrust violation for commercial bribery scheme between manu­
facturer’s employee and sales agent because legitimate agency relationship existed and 
no sales occurred between the two).
144  734 F.2d at 137-39.
145 Product Liab. Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 
1982); see supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
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ing that no antitrust offense could be established in the absence o f  
proof that the conduct adversely affected consumers.146
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. Judge Aldisert, writing 
for the court, concluded that a jury could find that the defendants 
and their agency had conspired among themselves and with the in­
surance company to terminate the plaintiff.147 The court then 
“part[ed] company” with Judge Posner’s Products Liability Insurance 
Agency analysis.148 Quoting the Third Circuit decision in Cemuto, Inc. 
v. United Cabinet Corp.,149 the court held that a common supplier’s 
refusal to deal induced by a competitor o f  the plaintiff may be hori­
zontal in nature, even though vertical in form.150 The court there­
fore concluded that Judge Posner’s characterization o f such 
restraints as vertical “is not binding and does not foreclose inquiry 
as to whether the defendants’ alleged agreement may have consti­
tuted a.perse violation where its principle impact was on the horizon­
tal level.” 151 Citing Klor’s152 and United States v. General Motors 
Corp.,153 the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury finding 
on the per se theory o f  horizontal group boycott.154
The “ought” question—what “ought” the goals o f  antitrust 
policy be—lies beneath courts’ manipulative categorization o f  a re­
straint as horizontal or vertical, their classification o f  conduct as 
within or without a category o f  per se illegality, and their deductive 
application o f  abstract economic theories. The results in Monsanto 
and Malley-Duff &  Associates assume that the values stressed by Klor’s 
are still applicable to antitrust analysis. In contrast, Judge Posner’s 
neoclassical approach in Products Liability Insurance Agency rejects 
these values as inappropriate goals for the federal antitrust laws.
Divisions over the legal definition o f  per se categories o f  liabil­
ity, determinations o f whether certain facts fall within a category o f  
condemned conduct, and what categories o f  conduct ought to be 
condemned on a per se basis will persist until this question o f  anti­
trust policy is resolved. A reflective resolution o f  this question re­
quires consideration o f at least the following: (1) the legislative 
policies behind the antitrust laws; (2) the role o f precedent; (3) the 
division o f  powers between Congress and the courts; (4) the facts
146  734 p.2d at 140.
147 id. at 142-44.
148 Id. at 140.
149 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979) (reversing summary judgm ent for defendant manu­
facturer who terminated price-cutting distributor at request o f competing distributor).
1 5 °  734 p.2d at 140-41.
151 Id. at 141.
152 359 U.S. 207 (1959); see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
153 384 U.S. 127 (1966); see supra note 139.
154 734 F.2d at 143-44.
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peculiar to disputes brought as antitrust cases; (5) the rights o f all 
parties to the dispute; (6) the long-range public interest; and (7) the 
nature o f legal reasoning and its deeper moral responsibilities. The 
final section o f this Article will expand upon these themes.155
C. The Horizontal/Vertical Distinction
Although Monsanto operated as both supplier and retail dis­
tributor o f  herbicides, the Monsanto Court did not address the ques­
tion o f whether Monsanto’s conduct constituted a horizontal price 
fixing conspiracy. Subsequent cases have ignored this horizontal as­
pect o f the Monsanto decision, although it could be used to narrow 
the holding’s significance. The Third Circuit’s need to characterize 
a vertically induced concerted refusal to deal as horizontal in impact 
in Malley-Duff &  Associates v. Crown Life Insurance Co.156 may represent 
a partial recognition o f the increased significance o f  the horizontal/ 
vertical distinction in an era o f  Supreme Court deference to neoclas­
sical economic analysis.
Regents of the University of California v. American Broadcasting Compa­
nies157 illustrates the horizontal/vertical distinction’s significance. 
In that case the plaintiffs, members o f  the Pacific-10 and Big Ten  
college football conferences, signed a contract with the Columbia 
Broadcasting System to broadcast their football games158 after the 
Supreme Court struck down the National Collegiate Athletic Associ­
ation’s (NCAA’s) exclusive bargaining agent status in NCAA v. Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.159 In contrast, the College 
Football Association (“CFA”), an association o f sixty-three major 
college football programs, had signed a contract designating the 
American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) “as the exclusive net­
work for member television coverage.”160 That contract prohibited 
CFA members from broadcasting their games on other networks, 
even when the game involved a non-CFA member like the Pacific-10 
and Big Ten schools.161 The plaintiffs claimed that the ABC-CFA 
contract restraint amounted to a group boycott and a cartel restrict­
ing the output o f televised games so as to enhance the value o f the 
ABC-CFA contract.162
155 See infra notes 169-242 and accompanying text.
156 734 p.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & As­
socs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
157 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984).
158 id. at 513-14.
159 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding NCAA’s position as exclusive bargaining agent un­
reasonable restraint).
ico  747 p.2d at 512-13.
161 Id.
162 id. at 516.
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On review o f the grant o f a preliminary injunction against the 
defendants, the court characterized the complaint as one alleging 
per se illegal price fixing and a group boycott. The court then dis­
tinguished the Supreme Court’s application o f the rule o f  reason 
standard in NCAA, by noting that, unlike the NCAA, the CFA did 
not produce a product in its regulation o f competition between 
member schools.163 Instead, the CFA seemed to exist solely for the 
purpose o f marketing its members’ television rights.164 Accord­
ingly, the Court rejected the defendants’ claim that their contract 
was essentially a vertical restraint on the distribution o f a product 
and suggested that the restraint amounted to a horizontal group 
boycott, rendering it per se illegal.165
Once an activity is classified as a horizontal restraint and char­
acterized as price fixing or a group boycott, few would hesitate to 
find it illegal per se. The assumptions and logic o f a neoclassical 
approach to the problem, however, suggest that a court should re­
quire that the plaintiffs prove injury to consumers, as well as to 
themselves, before condemning the restraint as illegal per se. In 
dissent, Judge Beezer seemed to adopt such a stance; he contested 
the question o f whether the restraint was horizontal or vertical166 
and characterized the dispute as involving competition between net­
work “packages” o f games rather than between the televising o f par­
ticular games.167 Whether all consumers o f  televised college 
football games should be treated alike is subject to doubt, as anyone 
familiar with the loyalties o f college alumni will attest. The model 
nonetheless homogenizes consumers in markets with vertical distri­
butional restraints, in order to protect the m odel’s consistency, real­
ity to the contrary notwithstanding.
The ABC decision may be siguificant for post -Monsanto litigation 
even though the horizontal/vertical discussion is dicta. Many o f the 
distributor termination cases following Monsanto might be catego­
rized as horizontal restraints because they involve claims o f a combi­
nation or conspiracy o f competing dealers using their common 
supplier to cut off or otherwise coerce a competing dealer.168 If a
•63 id. at 517-18.
164 Id. at 516-18.
165 Id. at 518. Although the court was merely evaluating the defendants’ likelihood 
o f success at trial, it suggested that the ABC-CFA agreement was virtually indistinguish­
able from that held illegal in NCAA. Id.
160 Id. at 526 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
ir,7 id.
1(58 Compare Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enters., 774 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(finding sufficient evidence to go to jury on allegation that supplier and prospective 
franchisees conspired to fix prices charged to competing present distributors) with Na­
tional Marine Elec. Distribs. v. Raytheon Co., 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985) (finding no 
merit in claim that supplier’s termination o f  plaintiff following competing dealers’ com- 
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plaintiff proves such a conspiracy, apart from whether its purpose is 
price related, some courts seem willing to classify the restraint as 
horizontal. These courts would characterize the conduct as one o f  
the horizontal per se restraints o f price fixing, division o f territories 
or customers, or a group boycott.
Watching future courts struggle with such abstract classification 
problems should prove interesting; the rise or fall o f  distinctions 
like horizontal or vertical, and classifications such as per se or rule 
o f reason restraints, will undoubtedly inspire plaintiffs to cast their 
complaints as horizontal restraints by competing dealers who use 
their common supplier to terminate or discipline the plaintiff, or 
whatever other form appears most advantageous. Even more inter­
esting will be whether the courts will recognize the problem as 
springing from their tendency to rely upon the rigid methodology o f  
deductive reasoning from a model detached from reality, and their 
practice o f establishing rigid per se rules to assess a complex reality. 
If so, courts may finally begin using inductive reasoning to weigh 
the actual facts o f  the dispute in light o f the general values Congress 
determined courts should implement in enforcing the antitrust laws.
Ill
T h e  “ O u g h t ”  o f  P o s t - M o n s a n t o  A n t i t r u s t  
R e g u l a t io n  o f  V e r t i c a l  R e s t r a i n t s
One cannot complete a tour o f  the post-Monsanto litigation 
without concluding that courts are in substantial conflict over im­
portant elements o f  the antitrust standards to be applied to vertical 
market restraints, a conflict which is the product o f on-going ideo­
logical warfare over the goals o f  antitrust policy. There is also a less- 
noticed problem with the methodology followed injudicial analysis 
o f antitrust cases generally, regardless o f  their underlying assump­
tions about antitrust policy. This problem is the way in which courts 
and commentators approach feet analysis in antitrust disputes and 
the antitrust laws’ general policy, as opposed to the preconceived 
substantive rules they bring to the process. Courts and commenta­
tors have come to rely upon fixed rules, rigid economic and legal 
concepts, a mechanical deductive logic, and cliches. In the process, 
they sacrifice a creative and inductive analysis o f the dispute’s actual 
facts in light o f  the law’s underlying policy goals and values, the in­
sights available from other disciplines, institutional constraints upon 
the courts, and concern for the long term consequences o f  a particu­
lar decision. As a result, courts and commentators determine the
plaints reflected horizontal agreement to fix prices). See also Marco Holding Co. v. Lear 
Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. 111. 1985) (denying summary judgm ent on allega­
tion that supplier terminated dealer to placate complaining dealers).
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“is” o f  the dispute without reference to its underlying facts; further­
more, they arrive at an “ought” that is dictated solely by the as­
sumptions and methodology they follow in applying predetermined 
rules to predefined facts, never examining the antitrust laws’ rele­
vance, meaning, and application as envisioned by Congress. As a 
long term consequence o f  such a process, antitrust policy will be­
come a wooden and irrelevant system o f law, incapable o f  imple­
menting the policies that Congress intended it to fulfill.
A. Defects In The Current Analytical Methodology For 
Judging The “Ought” O f Vertical Restraints
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &  Co.169 the United States 
Supreme Court struck down vertical territorial and customer restric­
tions where title to the goods has passed from a supplier to a distrib­
utor. The majority based its decision on the assumption that such 
restraints were “obviously destructive o f  competition,”170 reasoning 
that the common-law rule against restraints on alienation forbade 
the imposition o f  controls over the use or subsequent distribution o f  
property once title had passed to a buyer.171 Justices Stewart and 
Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, attacked the ma­
jority’s method o f  reasoning; they accused the majority o f  relying 
upon the rigid application o f an ‘“ancient rule’ ” 172 derived during 
the “reign o f Queen Elizabeth I”173 without taking account o f  mod­
em  reality, stating that:
[T]he state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrele­
vant to the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon 
vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today.
The problems involved are difficult and complex, and our re­
sponse should be more reasoned and sensitive than the simple 
acceptance of a hoary formula. . . . [T]he Court’s answer makes 
everything turn on whether the arrangement between a manufac­
turer and his distributor is denominated a “sale” or “agency.”
Such a rule ignores and conceals the “economic and business stuff 
out of which” a sound answer should be fashioned.174
The majority’s reliance upon a “wooden application o f  the 
venerable rule against restraints on alienation”175 was widely and
163 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
170 Id. at 379.
171 Id. at 380.
172 Id. at 393 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173 id. at 393 (quoting Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 H a r v .  L. R e v . 945, 
983 (1928)).
174 Id. at 392-93 (footnote omitted) (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
175  F ly n n , The Function and Dysfunction of Per Se Rules In Vertical Market Restraints, 58 
W a s h . U.L.Q. 767, 769 (1980).
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rightly criticized as “an exercise in barren formalism.”176 The deci­
sion ignored the complexities o f  m odem  mass marketing, the inter­
ests o f all o f  the parties to the restraint, and the insights o f economic 
analysis applied to legal problems. On a more basic, jurisprudential 
level, the Schwinn Court’s method, o f  analysis was inconsistent with a 
legitimate and sophisticated legal analysis o f  the “is” and the 
“ought” o f the dispute. The Schwinn Court should have used a crea­
tive analysis o f  all o f  the facts in light o f  the many broad values un­
derlying antitrust policy and the rich sources o f  wisdom (including 
but not limited to the potential insights o f economics and the pur­
poses underlying common law property rules) to pour contempo­
rary meaning into those values. Instead, the Schwinn Court’s 
method o f  reasoning constituted an epistemological decapitation o f  
the fact-finding process and bound its analysis with an intellectual 
straitjacket which prevented exploration o f a multitude o f  disci­
plines for insights into the contemporary meaning and application 
o f the antitrust policies.177
Advocates o f the exclusive use o f neoclassical economic analysis 
as the one true path for determining what the antitrust rules ought 
to be and how they ought to apply in specific antitrust disputes criti­
cized Schwinn with particular vigor.178 In essence, these critics com­
plained that the Court ignored the teachings o f  the hypotheses o f  
“economic analysis,” the deductively derived rules dictated by the 
artificial assumptions and hidden value choices o f  neoclassical eco­
nomic analysis. “Economic analysis,” according to its proponents, 
would demonstrate that all purely vertical restraints should be ana­
lyzed under the “rule o f reason” or should be presumed per se 
lawful.179
The basis o f  the economic analysis argument is easily ex­
plained. Pursuant to the model’s definitions and underlying value
176 Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44  
A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 537, 537 (1975). The leading articles criticizing Schwinn are collected in 
L. S c h w a r t z ,  J. F ly n n ,  & H. F i r s t ,  F r e e  E n t e r p r i s e  a n d  E c o n o m ic  O r g a n i z a t i o n :  
A n t i t r u s t  637 n.99 (6th ed. 1983).
177 The best summary o f  those values may be found in Fox, supra note 23, at 1146­
55.
178 See Bork, supra note 27, at 172 (“Schwinn’s result was not only wrong, but its 
rationale verged on mere wittiness.”); Posner, The Next Step In The Antitrust Treatment of 
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. C h i. L. R e v . 1 (1981) (same); Posner, Antitrust 
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and 
Potential Competition Decisions, 75 C o lu m . L. R e v . 282 (1975) (same) [hereinafter cited as 
Antitrust Policy], ln  som e instances, the criticism bordered on ridicule. See, e.g., Bork, 
supra note 27, at 179 (Schwinn opinion “inspired criticism bordering on ribaldry”).
179 See, e.g., Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One 
Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a JVay Out?, 67 V a. L . R e v . 1457 (1981) (advocating rule o f  reason 
analysis); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Le­
gality, 48 U . C h i .  L . R e v . 6 (1981) (advocating per se legality).
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choices, one assumes that the market is perfectly competitive, that a 
supplier’s motive for imposing a vertical restraint is to maximize 
output, that complex organizations behave in accord with the 
model’s definitions, and that the aggregate o f the micro will reflect 
the macro common good.180 Accordingly, courts should consider 
the proponent o f the restraint’s judgment as a surrogate for the 
legal system’s responsibility to determine whether the restraint vio­
lates the Sherman Act.181 In other words, neoclassicists would have 
courts adopt a wooden and inflexible rule o f  per se legality pre­
mised upon definitions and values extant in the time o f King George 
III, rather than rely like the Schwinn Court upon the rigid application 
o f the common law concepts o f restraints upon alienation derived 
during the reign o f Queen Elizabeth I.
Substituting one set o f rigid and artificial rules for another con­
tinues the process o f short-circuiting the legal process’s function.182 
The model distorts the “is” o f  disputes to obtain the necessary con­
180 Elsewhere, I have dissected the underlying assumptions o f neoclassical economic 
analysis, including, among others, the concepts o f rationality, supply, demand, and mar­
ginal cost. See Flynn, Appendix: Definitions and Assumptions of Economic Analysis, 12 Sw. U.L. 
R e v . 361 (1981); see also Flynn, The Misuse of Economic Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. 
U.L. R e v . 335 (1981) (criticizing simplified assumptions of economic analysis) [hereinaf­
ter cited as Misuse].
Advocates o f economic analysis use definitions rather than assumptions founded 
upon empirical observation, and they ignore the insights o f psychologists, sociologists, 
o r others having some experience with reality. See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some 
Realism About Nominalism, 60  V a. L. R ev. 451 (1974). Moreover, economic analysis ig­
nores time, causation, and the existence of a legal system defining pre-existing rights 
based on a pre-existing distribution o f entitlements. One o f course needs to control the 
number o f variables in constructing a hypothesis, lest it become too complex to be man­
ageable. However, there must be a limit to simplification if the model is to have any 
potential relevance to reality. T he compulsion to be a “science” may overwhelm com­
mon sense in some areas o f human inquiry, preventing the “scientist”  from understand­
ing that a particular area o f human inquiry requires performance on the higher level o f 
the artist.
181 See Bork, supra note 27, at 180-82 (vertical restraints are proconsumer and should 
be lawful); Antitrust Policy, supra note 178, at 298-99 (government must demonstrate sup­
plier’s bad motive for vertical restraint).
182 The economic analysis methodology resembles the Court’s approach during the 
era of “ substantive due process,” when the Court used the undefined concept o f due 
process to implement unstated normative objectives. In the last days of the judiciary’s 
assertion o f power to determine economic policy, proponents o f this form of simplistic 
rule application stated their analytical methodology in a single sentence:
When an act o f  Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not 
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch o f the Gov­
ernment has only one duty,—to lay the article o f the Constitution which is 
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the 
latter squares with the former.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). Advocates o f exclusively using neoclassi­
cal economics as the guide to antitrust policy appear to claim courts should follow a 
substantive due process type of methodology in antitrust litigation. Their basic maxim 
seems to be that when an activity is challenged in the courts as not conforming to the
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formity o f the facts to its unverified assumptions and definitions. 
Thus, the “scientific” model unknowingly sacrifices the process for 
determining the “ought” o f the decision. Not surprisingly, exclu­
sive reliance upon this form o f rigid rule application to analyze legal 
disputes is coming under increasing criticism, some o f which verges 
on outright ridicule.183
The law and economics approach o f neoclassical economics ad­
vocates patterns its methodology after an outmoded notion o f “sci­
entific” analysis which examines reality with fixed assumptions 
defining that reality.184 Based upon a series o f unrealistic assump­
model o f neoclassical economic theory, the judicial branch has only one duty—to lay the 
model beside the practice and “ to decide whether the latter squares with the former.” 
For an application o f a fixed ideological model to the woe& o f the Supreme Court, 
see Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term—Foreword: The Supreme Court and the Eco­
nomic System, 98 H a r v .  L. R e v . 4 (1984). The Easterbrook reincarnation o f the Butler 
methodology o f legal reasoning is criticized in Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice 
or Economic Efficiency?, 98 H a r v .  L. R e v . 592 (1985) (utilitarian approach ignores distribu­
tion o f  wealth and power and underlying definitions o f social values and perspectives). 
Judge Easterbrook responded to Tribe’s criticism in Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Au­
thority: A Reply, 98 H a r v .  L. R e v . 622 (1985), asserting the moral value o f judges’ apply­
ing neoclassical economic analysis while claiming that judges ought not impose their 
own moral views when deciding cases. A judge unaware o f and incapable o f  questioning 
his or her own moral values poses serious risks to the realistic, fair, and effective func­
tioning o f  the legal process. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap­
proach, 35 C o lu m . L. R e v . 809 (1935). In effect, Judge Easterbrook advocates judges’ 
assuming the role o f  philosopher kings while claiming to eschew such a role.
183 See, e.g., Flynn, Misuse, supra note 180, at 346 (“To make a fixed deductive model 
the premise o f an inductive legal system is to jam  a square peg into a round hole. The 
deductive square peg o f this kind o f  economic analysis mutilates the inductive round 
hole o f  the legal process . . . .”); Horowitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 H o f -  
s t r a  L. R e v . 905, 905 (1980) (“Future legal historians will need to exercise their imagi­
nations to figure out why so many people could have taken [economic analysis] so 
seriously.”). For a particularly harsh criticism o f antitrust’s exclusive reliance upon neo­
classical economic analysis, see Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusion of Models: The 
Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 G e o . L.J. 1511 (1984).
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars, sensitive to the complexities o f establishing 
the meaning o f  legal concepts, launch particularly harsh criticisms at the law and eco­
nomics movement. See Heller, The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: The Limitations 
of Legal Economics as a Basis for a LiberalJurisprudence—As Illustrated by the Regulation of Vaca­
tion Home Development, 1976 Wis.L. R e v . 385; Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. 
R e v . 769; Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem,
52 S. C a l .  L. R e v . 669 (1979); Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the 
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 A m . U.L. R e v . 939 (1985); Kennedy, Cost-Benejit Analysis of 
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 S t a n .  L. R e v . 387 (1981). For a thoughtful rejoinder to 
CLS, see Komhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 S t a n .  L. R e v . 349 (1984).
184 As Nobel Prize winner Wassily Leontief observed in an interview, this notion 
posits that scientific inquiry proceeds from theory to verification by observation, rather 
than from observation to theory with a never-ending interaction between the two (as in 
legal analysis):
Q. But don’t the mathematical physicists like, say, Einstein, start out 
with a formula first and then try to demonstrate it or prove it in the 
universe?
A. But Einstein knew what the concepts meant; they were not given.. . .
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tions, the neoclassical law and economics school derives definitions 
to create an abstract and static m odel.185 It then uses that model to 
make predictions about the real world and to determine the “is” 
and the “ought” for resolving legal disputes under antitrust policies 
defined by Congress.186
Many leaders o f the neoclassical movement claim that one 
should not compare reality with the model’s assumptions, but 
should compare the m odel’s implications with the facts observed in 
light o f the m odel.187 Apart from the questionable assertion that an 
allegedly empirically based model can be created out o f the thin air 
o f ideologically based definitions, the model itself dictates which 
facts and which values are relevant to an evaluation o f  its own impli­
Q. So then you think a lot of our [economists] empirical work has gone 
way beyond the quality and extent o f our data base?
A. Exactly, economics is getting too far removed from observation. Ob­
servation must be the origin o f the idea. Then there must be an interplay 
between observation and theory. . . . Observation by itself is the begin­
ning o f any science. At the outset you can only point out the object of 
your curiosity with your finger, because once you use words to describe it 
you are already beginning to theorize. Then you translate it into theoreti­
cal terms. . . . You translate the theoretical results into factual state­
ments, and you move forward by shuttling back and forth. That process 
is what propels you forward in developing a science.
Leontief, Why Economics Needs Input-Output Analysis (Interview), C h a l l e n g e ,  Mar.-Apr. 
1985, at 27, 29, 30; see also infra notes 217 & 227.
185 This abstract and static model is one of perfect competition. “Perfect competi­
tion” has been described as follows:
“Perfect” competition, in the terminology which seems to me most 
useful, means an absolutely “frictionless” world. Everybody knows 
everything, everyone can be everywhere at once, coal heavers can become 
brain surgeons, and brain surgeons coal heavers, overnight. The capital 
embodied in a university can transfer itself instantaneously into a battle­
ship and so on. Obviously such a set o f requirements defines an impossi­
bility; yet nothing less would give us the automatically functioning market 
some people are looking for.
W rig h t, Some PilfaUs of Economic Theory as a Guide to the Law of Competition, 37  V a. L. R ev. 
1083, 1085-86 (1951).
186 For an application o f such an approach across the board which ignores the goals 
for antitrust policy defined by Congress, see Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to 
the Cartelization Standard, 38 V a n d . L. R e v . 1125 (1985).
187 See, e.g., M. F r ie d m a n , The Methodology of Positive Economics, in E s s a y s  I n  P o s i t i v e  
E c o n o m ic s  3 (1966). The model’s assumptions determine what is “fact.” Thus, facts 
always conform to the model’s assumptions, because reality not in conformity with the 
model is not considered “reality.”  Professor Mason has criticized such an approach, 
observing:
Deception occurs because the pure theories o f this framework are 
consistently misapplied in the interpretation o f concrete reality. . . . 
[Accordingly, so-called empiricists have sought to verify their own hy­
potheses and to demolish contrary views by selection and manipulation 
o f data that cannot accomplish either purpose. Such performances have 
been characterized as, “blatantly ascientific” . . . and an “abandonment 
o f empirical science for a numerology similar to astrology.”
Mason, Some Negative Thoughts on Friedman's Positive Economics, 3 J . P o s t  K e y n e s ia n  E c o n . 
235, 244 (1980-81).
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cations. Testing the validity o f the model’s implications thus be­
comes a tautological exercise.188
The neoclassical economists’ reliance upon a rigid form o f de­
ductive logic in applying their model aids and abets this anti-empiri­
cal and anti-intellectual consequence.189 With its rigid use o f  
deductive logic, the model becomes an analytical meat cleaver which 
ignores noneconomic assumptions and fails to draw noneconomic 
inferences. The result: a form o f “tunnel vision,” 190 intolerant o f  
any questioning o f its assumptions or tampering with its predictions 
through observation o f facts other than those defined by the model.
The pattern o f post -Monsanto gyrations by advocates o f an ex­
clusively neoclassical approach to vertical market restraints demon­
strates the m odel’s inability to explain factual situations that go 
beyond the model’s prescribed ontology. The model dictates that 
the only valid reason for a supplier to impose a restraint (other than 
as part o f  a horizontal dealer or supplier cartel) is to maximize pro­
duction or distributional efficiencies to the great benefit o f consum­
ers.191 The model assumes that suppliers imposing such restraints
188 For example, the model defines “rational” choice without regard to the wisdom 
or social acceptability o f the choice. Defining “rational” as whatever someone chooses 
renders the concept virtually meaningless and can mislead the unsophisticated into be­
lieving that the model defines “rational” in its broader sense. The late Arthur Leff, 
commenting on Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, made the following observa­
tions about this type of circular reasoning:
Thus what people do is good, and its goodness can be determined by 
looking at what it is they do. In place o f the more arbitrary normative 
“goods” of Formalism, and in place o f the more complicated empirical 
“goods” of Realism, stands the simple definitionally circular “value” of 
Posner’s book. I f  human desire itself becomes normative (in the sense 
that it cannot be criticized), and if human desire is made definitionally 
identical with certain human acts, then those human acts are also beyond 
criticism in normative or efficiency terms; everyone is doing as best he 
can exactly what he set out to do which, by definition, is “good” for him.
In those terms it is not at all surprising that economic analyses have “con­
siderable power in predicting how people in fact behave.”
Leff, supra note 180, at 458 (quoting R. P o s n e r ,  E c o n o m ic  A n a ly s i s  o f  Law 5 (1973)); 
see also id. at 458 n.21 (“T hat is often the problem with heuristically simplified models; 
when you think you are describing a curve, you are really describing the graph paper.”).
189 Instead, more informal logic should be the tool for testing the assumptions un­
derlying the relevant rules. Ideally, logic in legal reasoning uses induction and analogy 
to examine the meaning and relevance of facts as well as the assumptions underlying 
rules in light of many factors: history, experience, cultural mores, common sense, 
changing values, and the insights o f such disciplines as sociology, psychology, and eco­
nomics. See Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 Y a le  L.J. 201 (1931).
190 Leff, supra note 180, at 452.
191 See, e.g., Antitrust Policy, supra note 178, at 283-85 (restraints serve to increase 
point-of-sale services to consumer). Professional economists consider the problem far 
more complicated than the simplistic analysis one usually encounters in the law reviews 
would suggest. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. E c o n .  & O r g a n i z a t i o n  177 (1985); 
cf. Acheson, The Maine Lobster Market: Between Market and Hierarchy, 1 J.L. E c o n .  & O r g a n i-  
z a t i o n  385 (1985)(highly fragmented industry not obeying classical model). See Phillips,
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are incapable o f raising prices above a certain level because o f com­
petition192 from similar or fungible products, or the threat o f new 
entries to the market. Consequently, a supplier imposing such re­
straints is acting in its own self-interest, and will only do so if the 
restraint enhances efficiency under conditions o f perfect competi­
tion and profit maximization.193
The exercise o f vertical restraints often increases prices to con­
sumers by curbing or abolishing intrabrand competition.194 The 
model must therefore provide some justification to consumers and 
distributors for the legal system’s allowing such activity. Hence, 
neoclassical economists created the concept o f the “free rider,”195
Schwinn Rules and the “New Economics” of Vertical Relations, 44 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 573 (1975) 
(“The motives for vertical integration are treated superficially in orthodox theory.”) ; 
Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 687 (1983) (“The theory is 
at something like the state o f celestial mechanics at the time o f Ptolemy . . . i.e., every­
thing revolved around the earth . . . .  Law is some distance behind. It is more or less at 
the state where the stars are on fixed poles relative to the earth.”); Steiner, The Nature of 
Vertical Restraints, 30 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  143, 171-87 (1985) (describing several scenarios 
in which vertical restraints are common yet socially inefficient).
192 There are, o f course, several concepts o f  “competition,” suggesting the need for 
great care when using the term to draw the line between legality and illegality. As one 
commentator has written:
Competition is different things to different men and many things to all 
men. . . .  It may be free, pure, perfect, open, imperfect, atomistic, vi­
cious, destructive, cut-throat, monopolistic, oligopolistic, workable, effec­
tive, capitalistic, socialistic, Darwinian. A large variety o f meanings for a 
term, when a precise meaning is difficult or impossible to distinguish 
clearly from the context, may make seemingly clear statements deceptive 
or meaningless. . . .
The elusive and changing character o f the term, competition, be­
comes more than ju s t semantics when that which is illegal is defined in 
terms o f competition.
Bernhard, Competition in Law and in Economics, 12 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  1099, 1100 (1967).
The same may be said for the concept o f “efficiency.” “Efficiency” may be, and is, 
used in several different senses: productive efficiency, allocative efficiency, innovative 
efficiency, etc. More often than not, the neoclassical economic model uses the tautologi­
cal sense o f defining whatever outcome the model predicts as “efficient.” This use once 
again misleads the unsophisticated into believing that following the model produces effi­
ciency and that rejecting the model (or considering other factors) produces an inefficient 
result. See Peritz, supra note 22, at 1281-92 (defining and criticizing Posner’s various 
uses of “efficiency”).
193 Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for 
Antitrust?, 125 U. P a . L. R e v . 1214, 1215 (1977) (restating and criticizing neoclassical 
model).
194 Even where the conduct does not lead to higher prices, it may still violate the 
antitrust laws by infringing upon other congressional goals for antitrust enforcement. 
See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medi­
cal Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (viewing maximum price fixing as interference with trad­
ers’ freedom to set prices, displacement o f  competitive market pricing, and assumption 
o f governmental powers by private combination); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 
(1968) (same).
195 The “free rider” concept originated in Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair 
Trade?, 3 J.L. & E c o n .  86, 91 (1960). For a review o f the evolution o f the “free rider”
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the notion that suppliers must be free to shelter distributors per­
forming demonstration, repair, warranty, or other services from 
competition by distributors not performing such services and there­
fore able to sell the product at a lower price. The label suggests that 
the “free rider” gets something (a competitive advantage) for noth­
ing, and does so at the expense o f  an honest supplier and its dealers 
who are slavishly devoted to the public interest.196 Admitting that 
the “free rider” may be engaged in the very competition the anti­
trust laws were designed to foster197 would call into question the 
model’s coherence and reliance upon the supplier’s self-interested 
choice to impose his or her will on dealers (or vice versa). It would 
also call into question the suitability o f  the model’s legal enforce­
ment as a surrogate for independent determination o f the permissi­
ble scope o f vertical restraints.
For example, the use o f resale price maintenance in the distri­
bution o f  products where the provision o f  customer services is non­
existent198 spurred the model’s true believers to provide a broader 
rationale. The explanation needed to be consistent with both the 
model’s assumptions and the laissez faire ideology which fuels it. 
Professor Victor Goldberg advanced one such hypothesis: manufac­
turers impose vertical restrictions to obtain the “provision o f serv­
ices by retailers to manufacturers” as well as consumers where a “free 
rider” threat exists.199 The manufacturer “services” Goldberg hy­
pothesizes as justifying vertical restraints include the rental o f  “shelf 
space,”200 the buying o f  “endorsement” services by association with
theory, see Popofsky & Bomse, From Sylvania to Monsanto: No Longer a “Free Ride, ” 30 
A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  67, 87 (1985); see also Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of 
Reason, 53 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 135 (1984) (carrying theory to its potentially libertarian ex­
treme by urging legality o f all vertical restrictions); Scherer, supra note 191, at 694-97 
(questioning “free rider” phenomenon).
196
“Free riders” are assumed to be a potential evil justifying every vertical 
restraint. The ill-defined concept o f “free rider” apparently is attached to 
buyers or competitors not abiding by any goal a seller seeks to achieve by 
a vertical restraint. The neoclassical theology condemns “free riders” as a 
plague and denounces their rights and rationalities as beyond notice by 
the law.
Flynn, “Reaganomics” and Antitrust Enforcement: A Jurisprudential Critique, 1983 U t a h  L. R ev. 
269 , 290.
197 See Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against 
Vertical Price Fixing, 71 G e o . L.J. 1487, 1493 (1983) (“Until the recent ideology about 
‘free riders’ became fashionable, they were regarded as the very heart o f a free market 
competitive system.”).
198 See Pitofsky, Why “Dr. Miles” Was Right, 8 R e g . 27, 29 (1984); Scherer, supra note 
191, at 694; Steiner, supra note 191, at 156-60.
199 See Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Impetfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing 
Services, 79 Nw. U.L. R e v . 736, 737 (1984).
200 at 738-44.
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the distributor’s reputation,201 and the “bonding” o f a distributor 
by “paying” the distributor a high return on present sales.202
Although much o f  Goldberg’s hypothesis remains specula­
tive,203 it is an imaginative attempt to square recalcitrant reality with 
the model’s dictates. Some may object that the hypothesis would 
result in higher prices to consumers forced to pay for the “service” 
o f shelf space rental, “endorsement” services, or “bonding.”204
2 0 1 Id. at 744-48.
202 Id. at 749.
203 Professor Goldberg’s article is laden with “can”, “might”, “could” and hy­
pothetical introduced by these modifiers. Although speculation o f this sort can be a 
useful way to challenge existing assumptions, it is highly misleading when used for the 
opposite purpose—that is, to confirm assumptions rather than question their predicates.
The perspective adopted here provides a rich array o f plausible ratio­
nales for adopting vertical restrictions. Indeed, this article concludes that 
we have almost an embarrassment o f riches; there are too many explana­
tions. That does not mean that we will be incapable of distinguishing 
among alternative explanations. I t simply means that we cannot get away 
with flip answers to hard questions.
Goldberg, supra note 199, at 738 (citations omitted).
The fact that these rationales may be plausible does not mean that they are in fact 
true, or that the legal system ought to recognize them, or that they provide a less “flip 
answer” to “hard questions” than those answers found by relying upon the model. Gen­
eralizing from a specific hypothetical, particularly where one’s understanding o f the hy­
pothetical is dictated by an abstract model premised upon artificial assumptions, does 
little to advance the law’s understanding o f reality. Basing the rules o f the legal control 
o f vertical restraints upon such speculation detaches the analysis o f specific disputes 
even further from reality and confines the analysis o f what the law ought to be to the 
narrow range of values underlying the speculation.
Professor Goldberg’s remarks at the 1986 meeting o f the Antitrust Law and Eco­
nomics Section o f the AALS proceeded on the assumption that markets are perfectly 
competitive and that Congress adopted that model as the sole guide for the courts to use 
in defining the scope of antitrust policy. Goldberg, The Vertical Restraints Guidelines of 
the DOJ: An Appreciation, Remarks before the Antitrust Law and Economics Section of 
the American Association o f Law Schools (Jan. 5, 1986) (on file at Cornell Law Review) 
[hereinafter cited as Goldberg’s Remarks], The former is unrealistic; the latter has been 
discredited by both the careful scholarship of objective scholars, see Fox, supra note 23; 
H. T h o re ll i ,  T he F ed era l A n ti t r u s t  P oucy  (1955), and Congress’s continued expres­
sions of disapproval o f the Reagan administration’s antitrust enforcement policy in the 
area o f vertical restraints, see infra note 242.
During the debate following his remarks, Goldberg misstated my criticism as one 
seeking increased “jo b  security for dealers.” Antitrust and Economic Regulation and Compar­
ative Law Sections foint Program (cassette tape o f proceedings available from Recorded 
Resources Corp., Crofton, Md.). As should be obvious from this article, my criticism is a 
much broader and deeper jurisprudential one. Moreover, my criticism does not favor 
“job  security for dealers,” although the Goldberg hypothesis may be characterized as 
“welfare for suppliers” in that it unquestioningly protects their absolute property and 
contract rights while ignoring the rights of others affected by the restraint.
204 See Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust 
Policy, 98 H a r v .  L. R e v . 983, 990-92 (1985) (consumers not homogenous in need of 
same services).
In many instances, vertical restraints result in higher prices for all consumers in 
order to cover the cost o f services a supplier o r its distributors believe some consumers 
need. Professor Goldberg bluntly justifies his shelf space/endorsem ent/bonding thesis
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Such complaints, however, would probably issue from those not em­
bracing the assumption that a supplier freely exercising its property 
and contract rights also acts in the best interests o f  the otherwise 
uninformed consumer coerced by the restraint.205
An unenlightened consumer or distributor may not appreciate 
the benefit being conferred upon him or her because the model as­
sumes that only the supplier’s legally protected property and contract 
rights matter. The model’s use o f  a fixed assumption about rights 
and rationalities to define distributors’ and consumers’ rights in an­
titrust litigation is never explicitly acknowledged. The situation is 
analogous to the assumptions relied upon to justify the “fair trade” 
movement which was designed to freeze the status quo o f distribu­
tion practices in order to protect existing distributors’ rights from 
the methods, such as catalog and discount sales, employed by dis­
tributors whose rights were ignored.206 Perhaps such reasoning is 
based upon a variant o f  the “trickle down” theory in that it argues 
that by protecting and enhancing the “haves’ ” power and wealth, 
benefits will “trickle down” to the “have nots.”
The model, despite its superficial libertarian appeal, presup­
poses the existence o f  a legal system and a set o f  property and con­
tract rights belonging to the proponent o f  a restraint. This legal 
system, according to the model, ought to protect these rights with­
out concern for the property and contract rights o f  others affected 
by the restraint.207 Thus, the model presents “half-a-loaf” libertari­
in the name o f retailer services to manufacturers, Goldberg’s Remarks, supra note 203, at 
7, or, to coin a slogan, “manufacturer welfare.” He assumes, o f course, that the manu­
facturer is subject to perfect competition and therefore maximizes both consumer and 
manufacturer welfare. The “ rich array o f plausible rationales for adopting vertical re­
strictions,” Goldberg, supra note 199, at 738, does not account for the possibility o f 
imperfections in either competition or some o f the assumptions underlying the model 
(i.e., perfect information, consumers can be everywhere at once, all parties are bargain­
ing freely). Because he does not recognize the possibility o f  such imperfections, Profes­
sor Goldberg sees no reason why the rational supplier might be tempted to impose 
vertical restraints for monopolistic purposes, rather than on behalf o f consumer welfare. 
Embracing such an imperfect reality would disrupt the frictionless functioning of the 
model, destroy its internal coherence, and threaten the underlying ideology tbe model 
serves.
205 The text focuses on the scenario o f the supplier-imposed restraint on dealers for 
convenience, and because that is the most common pattern in antitrust litigation. How­
ever, powerful distributors may impose vertical restraints on unwilling suppliers. Cf. 
Kartell v. Blue Shield o f Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984) (insurance company 
imposed price schedule upon physicians supplying services to insured patients), cert, de­
nied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 (1985).
206 The history of the “fair trade” movement is summarized in L. S c h w a r t z ,  J. 
F ly n n ,  & H. F i r s t ,  supra note 176, at 590-98.
207 T he  common law tradition recognizes both property and contract rights as cre­
ations o f  society. See Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 C o r n e l l  L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) (“In 
the world o f nature apart from more or less organized society, there are things but 
clearly no property rights.”); Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Y a le  L.J. 454 (1909) (contract
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anism; it objects to government interference with the market except 
to enforce the property and contract rights and rationality o f  those 
imposing the restraint. The model then uses the right to legally en­
force one side’s “rationality” to define what the legal system’s rules 
ought to be concerning the scope o f  property and other rights o f  
suppliers, distributors, and consumers. One commentator point­
edly observed:
[M]ost current law and economics theory represents neo-concep­
tualism strikingly similar to the classical conceptualism success­
fully undermined by the realists. The law and economics model is 
the model of free, value-enhancing exchange, yet . . .market ex­
changes are in fact a function of the legal order; the terms of so- 
called free bargains (and, taken collectively, the supposedly objec­
tive market price) are determined by the legally protected right to 
withhold what is owned. Exchange “value” (and “costs”) is a 
function of that right, so that the rationale of exchange is ulti­
mately as circular and self-referencing as the rationale for legal 
rights.The legitimacy of every exchange calculus depends upon 
the legitimacy of prior legal decisions; it neither establishes that 
legitimacy nor evades the problem of legitimacy by a purported 
ahistorical objectivity. Similarly, judges cannot escape responsi­
bility for the distributional consequences of legal decisions. The 
exchange calculus cannot be divorced from the question of distri­
bution, since exchange is a function of the existing distribution of 
legal entidement, and every new legal decision (including those 
that rigorously apply the law and economics approach) will inevi­
tably affect subsequent distribution and, in turn, affect subsequent 
exchanges, costs, values, etc. Like the older spheres of private 
and public, questions of market exchange and of distribution sim­
ply collapse into each other.208
rights created by society). Although it does not explicitly state that property and con­
tract rights are inherent in individuals, the neoclassical paradigm appears to proceed  
from such a premise. If so, the assumption is contrary to basic legal and normative 
assumptions about the nature o f  such rights in our society and is contrary to the tradi­
tional view that the antitrust laws are a limitation upon the exercise o f  such rights by the 
sovereign creating them.
T he paradigm thus asserts a radical set o f  normative values premised on an absolu­
tist view o f  property and contract rights held by one class o f  society against the rest. As 
a consequence, the model provides the means for an absolute defense o f  the status quo 
that is antithetical to the goals o f  antitrust policy and the moral objectives o f  classical 
economic theorists who argued for regulating society’s economic affairs through the 
maintenance o f  competition.
2 0 8  e .  Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in T h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  L aw : A 
P r o g r e s s i v e  C r i t i q u e  18, 37 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). In a similar vein, Professor Samuels 
has observed:
Regnlation involves choices between alternative rules o f  the game and 
between alternative assignments o f  rights that are logically prior to eco­
nomic analysis. Economics can no more tell us what rules and rights 
structures should be than what technology and tastes should exist. Thus,
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Although seldom clearly articulated, the model assumes that a 
supplier’s property rights and the rights o f a dealer seeking to im­
pose the restraint are absolute. The model both adopts a libertarian 
conception o f property and assumes that vertical relationships are 
the product o f freely-bargained contracts, thus presenting an uneasy 
marriage o f a nineteenth-century view o f contracts and an eight­
eenth-century view o f reality.
Legal theorists, however, have long considered property rights 
negative rights, that is, community-defined rights to invoke the 
state’s aid to exclude others from the use or possession o f some­
thing o f value.209 Antitrust’s prohibition on contracts in restraint o f  
trade is part o f the community’s definition o f the scope o f one’s en­
forceable property and contract rights. In vertical restraint cases, so­
ciety calls upon courts to sort out conflicting rights between buyer, 
seller, and community in light o f the antitrust laws’ goals. For exam­
ple, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &  Sons,210 the Court re­
fused to enforce Doctor Miles’s property rights in its patent 
medicines in a way restricting a subsequent owner’s property right 
to alienate the property at a price o f its choosing. The Court’s ac­
tion proceeded from the assumption that the creation and enforce­
ment o f property rights are central functions o f a society’s legal 
system.211 The Court weighed the scope o f one’s right to call upon 
the legal system to enforce the community-created right in light o f  
the distributor’s and the public’s property and contract rights.
Similarly, United States v. Addyston Pipe &  Steel Co.,212 a nine­
teenth-century case examining the common law attitude toward
for the economist to assert the substance o f  “optimal” regulation, or the 
regulatory policy that will result in the optimal level or direction o f  con­
trol . . .  is to assert covertly the rules and rights structures and to reach 
beyond economic analysis to antecedent normative premises as to whose 
interests should count. . . .
. . . With no unique optimal use o f  resources and opportunities in­
dependent o f  rights identification and assignment, the legal system must 
select the result to be pursued: the definition of the efficient solution is both the 
object and the subject of the legal system. It is ironic that much conventional 
analysis assumes fully defined rights and a principle mandating compen­
sation. . . .
. . . T oo often, policy conclusions are tautological, with implicit nor­
mative premises that assume something about the object to be deter­
mined which prefigures the determination— typically, o f  whose interest is 
to count.
Samuels, Normative Premises in Regulatory Theory, 1 J. P o s t  K e y n e s ia n  E c o n . 100, 105-06,
111 (1978) (emphasis in original).
209 See Cohen, supra note 207. For a historical examination o f  the nature o f  contract 
rights, see Pound, supra note 207.
2 10 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
211 Id. at 406-09 (discussing public interests at stake in litigation).
2 12 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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contracts in restraint o f trade, proceeded from the assumption that 
even freely bargained contract rights are creatures of the legal sys­
tem which creates them for reasons beyond the mere advancement 
of the rationality o f one party to the “bargain.” Defining the scope 
of enforceable contract rights necessarily involves the rationality 
and interests o f both parties and the public.213
The antitrust laws constitute a community-imposed limitation 
on the right to contract, a limitation which transcends the bare as­
sumption that the right to contract is absolute on one side of the 
bargain, that in the real world parties o f equal power in a perfectly 
competitive market freely bargain, or that one may ignore the rights 
of other parties to the contract and the public in general. Among 
the factors to be considered in fixing one’s contract rights are the 
impact of the exercise o f those rights upon the other party to the 
contract and the community, defined by reference to the congres­
sional purposes o f the antitrust laws and to the courts’ experience in 
enforcing those purposes in actual disputes.
An analytical model that precludes a court from balancing these 
interests, such as the model employed in Schwinn214 or that pro­
posed by advocates of the exclusive use o f neoclassical economics to 
decide such disputes, is fundamentally at odds with the analytical 
methodology o f the legal process. The legal process’s most basic 
purpose is to resolve disputes in accord with their facts, in light of 
the normative values underlying society’s laws. To achieve its pur­
pose, the legal process must avoid locking itself into an unrealistic 
view o f reality and a doctrinaire ideology detached from the law’s 
normative objectives.
Unsurprisingly, the neoclassical economic model has been de­
scribed as “blatantly ascientific” and an abandonment of “empirical 
science for a numerology similar to astrology.”215 Nor is it any won­
der that many leading professional economists have come to despair 
the “poverty” of their discipline216 as it is consumed by an ever 
more arcane pursuit to defend the model’s internal coherence and 
ideology in light of a reality that stubbornly refuses to validate the 
model’s assumptions.217
213 Id. at 280.
214 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)•, see supra notes 169­
77 and accompanying text.
215  Mason, supra note 187, at 244.
210  See Kuttner, The Poverty of Economics, T h e  A t l a n t i c  M o n th ly , Feb. 1985, at 74.
217 See Leontief, supra note 184. Professor Leontief observed:
I really had some magnificent ideas from those [eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century] economists to develop my approach. But other 
economists who inherited those ideas continued to theorize instead of 
collecting more facts. When they ran out o f facts, they began to make 
assumptions. This is where modem academic economics began to go
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Unthinking application of the model may also transgress the 
constitutional right to a jury trial on contested issues of fact218 and 
the underlying separation o f governmental powers. Although 
courts possess wide discretion in interpreting broadly worded stat­
utes like the Sherman Act, that discretion is not unlimited. Since 
the end of the reign o f economic substantive due process, courts 
have recognized Congress’s power to determine economic policy.219 
Now, as during the time of economic substantive due process, the 
failure to acknowledge the appropriate division of lawmaking pow­
ers between the courts and Congress threatens to sacrifice the judi­
ciary’s policy-making function in areas where that function is 
appropriate.220
The Congresses that adopted the antitrust laws did not envision 
the enshrinement of the abstract and unrealistic neoclassical con­
cept of efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust policy. Indeed, Profes­
sor Fox has pointed out that the primary opponents of the Sherman 
Act were those who subscribed to the neoclassical concept of effi­
ciency.221 The majority o f the legislators, however, had in mind four
wrong. In the 1930’s . . .  I suggested that the way to build a quantitative 
theory is to observe reality, and to define certain concepts.. . .  Your con­
cepts first need some empirical meaning and content. . . . Academic 
economists in our day have generally not been subject to the harsh disci­
pline o f systematic fact-finding. Our colleagues in the natural sciences 
have always had to find data, to generate data from observations. Since 
economists can’t run controlled experiments, they developed an irresisti­ble predilection for deductive reasoning, ln fact, many o f our economists 
entered the discipline after specializing in pure or applied mathemat­
ics. . . .  Typically, such economists first developed a theory, then wrote it 
as a formula, and then proceeded with defining its terms in such a way as 
to make it true.
Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
218 The extensive and widespread use o f summary judgment to terminate vertical 
restraint cases, usually on the ground o f insufficient evidence to prove a contract, con­
spiracy, or price-fixing conduct, raises the question o f whether some courts are infring­
ing upon the right to jury trial. This issue clearly concerned the Monsanto Court, as did 
the division o f powers between the Court and Congress in determining what economic 
policy ought to be followed with regard to vertical price fixing. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 
769 (Brennan, J., concurring). See S. Rep. N o. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 
1975 U.S. C o d e  C o n g . & A d. N ew s 1569, 1572 (repeal o f “Fair Trade” exemption for 
resale price maintenance intentionally left “coerce[d] adherence” to suggested resale 
prices “illegal”).
Advocates o f a neoclassical approach to vertical and other restraints ignore the im­
portant issue o f the institutional constraints on courts in determining what antitrust pol­
icy ought to mean. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp, 780 F.2d 1212, 1217
& n.l (5th Cir. 1986) and articles cited therein.
219  See G. G u n th e r ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Law  128-47 (11th ed. 1985); L. T r ib e . A m eri­
c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Law  47-52, 232-36 (1978).
22°  See Pound, supra note 207, at 487 (economic substantive due process causes “lost 
respect for courts and law”).
221 Fox, supra note 23, at 1152-53 & n.71 (citing Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the 
Antitrust Laws, 73 C o lu m . L. Rev. 555 (1973)); see also H. T h o r e l l i ,  supra note 203 (ex­
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major goals when they adopted the antitrust laws, goals which have 
continued to motivate recent amendments. Professor Fox has sum­
marized these goals as: “ (1) dispersion of economic power, (2) free­
dom and opportunity to compete on the merits, (3) satisfaction of  
consumers, and (4) protection of the competition process as market 
governor.”222 In her extensive elaboration of the sources and 
meanings for these antitrust goals, Professor Fox identifies a central 
meaning for the concept o f “competition” that has significance in 
the context o f vertical restraints:
One overarching idea has unified these three concerns (dis­
trust of power, concern for consumers, and commitment to op­
portunity for entrepreneurs): competition as process. The 
competition process is the preferred governor of markets. If the 
impersonal forces of competition, rather than public or private 
power, determine market behavior and outcomes, power is by def­
haustive study o f events and contemporary thought surrounding passage o f Sherman 
Act).
Judge Bork is the only proponent of neoclassical economic analysis who pays much 
attention to the legislative purposes of the federal antitrust laws. He interprets that 
history to say that Congress’s sole goal in adopting the Sherman Act was to enforce the 
neoclassical concept of economic efficiency. R . Bork, T h e  A n t i t r u s t  Paradox 50-71
(1978). In fact, the legislative history of the Sherman Act is “overwhelming[ly] to the 
contrary,” Fox, supra note 23, at 1154 n. 76, indicating that Judge Bork has fitted the 
legislative history to his preordained theory, rather than constructed his theory out of 
the legislative history. As Professor Leontief observed, it is a case of first developing a 
theory, then writing it as a formula, and then defining its terms in such a way as to make 
it “ true.” Leontief, supra note 184, at 29.
222 Fox, supra note 23, at 1182. The goals of antitrust policy in the private sphere 
are analogous to the goals o f the dormant commerce clause as a limitation upon the 
exercise of protectionist state economic regulation. Justice Jackson stated the Court’s 
philosophy in interpreting the commerce clause as follows:
This Court consistently has rebuffed attempts of states to advance their 
own commercial interests by curtailing the movement o f articles of com­
merce, either into or out of the state, while generally supporting their 
right to impose even burdensome regulations in the interest of local 
health and safety. . . .
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer 
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that 
he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home em­
bargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs, 
duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look 
to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to pro­
tect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision o f the Founders; 
such has been the doctrine o f this Court which has given it reality.
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535, 539  (1949).
The Court’s role in applying this function o f the Commerce Clause has evolved 
from the mcchanical application of formulae (such as direct and indirect effects on com- 
mercc, or physical movement in commercc versus an effect on commerce) to a complex 
balancing o f the competing qualitative interests o f the federal and state governments. 
The Court usually relies on a competitive process of free trade at the federal level, but at 
times curbs the competitive process to serve the public interest in light of the specific 
facts of individual eases and the local impact o f state-regnlated practices.
HeinOnline -- 71 Cornell L. Rev, 1139 1985-86
1140 CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 71:1095
inition dispersed, opportunities and incentives for firms without 
market power are increased, and the results are acceptable and 
fair. Some measure of productive and allocative efficiency is a by­
product, because competition tends to stimulate lowest-cost pro­
duction and allocate resources more responsively than a visible 
public or private hand.223
Advocates o f the exclusive use o f neoclassical analysis to deter­
mine the “ought” o f antitrust policy reject Congress’s intent regard­
ing vertical and other restraints. They do so in part because they see 
the model and its seductive two dimensional graphs as a way to 
quantify “reality” and bring certainty to courts’ determination of 
what the rules ought to mean and how they ought to apply in spe­
cific cases. Their solution, however, is a false quantification con­
structed upon the mysticism of the model’s underlying assumptions, 
and the theological definitions dictating what facts and values are 
relevant to the analysis.
Neoclassical advocates also dismiss the unavoidable concern224 
with normative goals other than those their model assumes by 
claiming that these other goals are unknowable, undefined, or “po­
etry.”225 But legal analysis constantly confronts a reality that re­
fuses to conform with fixed, preconceived notions; it always deals 
with vagueness in the central concepts used in decision making. 
When scratched by reality, concepts like “efficiency” and “rational” 
are similarly vague and poetic, for they are defined tautologically 
from a model which is detached from the reality it purports to char­
acterize. The neoclassicists view the interpretation o f vague con­
223 Fox, supra note 23, at 1154 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the concept o f competition, when used to give
meaning to the Sherman Act’s ban on contracts in restraint o f trade, be understood as a 
congressional mandate to ensure that the competitive process be the rule o f trade. I 
have also suggested that the concept o f the competitive process be understood in the 
qualitative sense o f measuring the impact of the conduct upon the rights o f those af­
fected by the restraint and the rights o f consumers to the benefits o f a competitive pro­
cess. See Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for Reducing the 
Chaos, 49 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 1593, 1623-27 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Chaos]; Flynn, supra 
note 175, at 768-70. “The issue is not a quantitative one o f determining how much com­
petition is effected [sic] or destroyed by the practice, although power, relevant market 
and quantitative effect may aid in determining qualitative impact in some limited circum­
stances.” Chaos, supra, at 1611 (emphasis in original). Framing the type o f competition 
the Sherman Act was meant to protect in this way gives effect to congressional purposes 
in enacting the antitrust laws, while providing guidance for determining the general 
meaning o f the common law rules.
224  See Cohen, supra note 182 (every legal decision is unavoidably a moral decision).
225 Judge Bork used the concept o f poetry in a debate before President Carter’s 
National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures to describe the 
reliance upon social and political values, as well as economic ones, to establish the anti­
trust laws’ meaning. See "No-Fault" Monopolization Proposal Debated by Presidential Commis­
sion oil Antitrust Reform, [July-Dee.] A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . Rep. (BNA) No. 880, at A-
22 (Sept. 14, 1978).
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cepts as merely subjective “poetry,” as opposed to objective 
analysis, and they are equally extreme in their claim that their model 
affords objective certainty by reducing to two static dimensions mul­
tidimensional, complex, and dynamic phenomena.226
Exclusive reliance upon the model provides for the enforce­
ment o f the property and contract rights of the restraint’s propo­
nent, without regard for the rights of others entangled by the 
restraint. Thus, the model does not protect those entangled by the 
restraint, including consumers, all o f whom have a right to receive 
the economic, social, and political benefits o f the competitive pro­
cess mandated by Congress. Furthermore, with all its imperfec­
tions, reality requires a more flexible approach than the one dictated 
by the model. At best, courts should only use the model to identify 
facts diverging from the model’s “perfect competition” axiom, 
thereby stimulating greater thought about the model itself, the facts 
of the dispute, and solutions that acknowledge Congress’s goals for 
antitrust policy.227 Courts should not use the model to impose fixed
226  Paradoxically, law’s over-reliance on formalistic economic analysis is probably a 
consequence o f the success o f the legal realists’ attack on formalism in law. Legal for­
malism depends upon the parsing o f legal rules and past decisions to derive the “right” 
rule, followed by the deductive application o f that rule to the dispute’s facts. The realist 
attack stressed the superficiality o f such an approach and its failure to account for reality, 
the insights o f other disciplines, and the relevance o f the decision maker’s values in the 
decision-making process. Some proponents o f the law and economics approach are 
constructively responding to the legal formalism of another age when they offer the 
insights of economic analysis (at least empirically based economic analysis) as one 
source of wisdom to inform legal decision making about reality. See Flynn, Antitrust Juris­
prudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals o f Antitrust Policy— Introduc­
tion, 125 U. Pa. L. R ev. 1182 (1977) (discussing approaches of different scholars). There 
are, o f course, a multiplicity of other sources o f wisdom to inform antitrust policy. See, 
e.g., Sullivan, supra note 193.
Many proponents o f the neoclassical approach to law, including Judges Bork, Pos­
ner, and Easterbrook, argue that the neoclassical approach should be the sole considera­
tion in determining what antitrust rules ought to be. In effect, they seek the restoration 
of a discredited form o f formalism or analytical positivism. They advocate a form of 
“flatlaw”—one dimensional thinking which is incapable o f discharging the functions 
Congress has assigned to the courts in antitrust enforcement or the functions of the 
legal process generally. See Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions o f Legal Reasoning 
and the Development o f Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 C a l i f .  L. R ev. 288 (1984). 
Although Terrell cites the use o f economic analysis in law as a potential means o f rising 
above the relatively low level o f “flatlaw” analysis, id. at 304-06, the type o f analysis 
offered by those cited and the insistence that it be used to the exclusion o f all other 
considerations, constitutes the reimposition of a “flatlaw” type of analysis, or an even 
lower form of one dimensional analysis—“linelaw” analysis, id. at 306.
227
True advance can be achieved only through an iterative process in which 
improved theoretical formulation raises new empirical questions and the 
answers to these questions, in their turn, lead to new theoretical insights.
The “givens” o f today become the “unknowns” that will have to be ex­
plained tomorrow. This, incidentally, makes untenable the admittedly 
convenient methodological position according to which a theorist does
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conceptions o f the “ought” o f vertical restraints upon a legal pro­
cess charged with defining the “ought” in light o f the “is” and in 
light o f Congress’s antitrust values.
B. A Proposed Method For The Analysis 
O f Vertical Restraints
The courts have swung from the rigid application of a rule 
against restraints on alienation to the utilization o f a rigid economic 
model detached from the reality of the dispute before the court. 
Substituting one incomplete set o f premises and a wooden method­
ology for another is a curious jurisprudential development perhaps 
driven by a “quest for certitude [that] is so ardent that we pay an 
irrational reverence to a technique which uses symbols o f certainty, 
even though experience again and again warns us that they are delu­
sive.”228 The magic of simple definitions and graphs claiming to be 
empirically based can easily beguile even the sophisticated. Yet the 
certainty and predictability it offers is an illusion, and a dangerous 
one at that. The neoclassical model frustrates the congressionally 
mandated goals o f antitrust policy, the functions and responsibilities 
of the judicial process vis-a-vis the other branches o f government, 
and the obligations o f the legal process to deal constructively with 
the reality o f disputes presented. It imports into the flexible process 
of legal analysis a rigid and narrow analytical methodology that is 
hostile to the legal decision making’s obligation to decide the “is” 
and “ought” o f disputes in accord with the normative objectives of  
the law involved and an evolving understanding o f reality sensitive 
to the insights o f a variety o f disciplines.229
The per se/rule o f reason dichotomy has generated much o f the 
present difficulty in antitrust litigation. The Court’s early reliance 
upon an identical form of rigid deductive reasoning to determine 
the legality o f vertical restraints led to the diametrically opposed 
conclusions it reached in Schwinn and GTE Sylvania. This dichotomy
not need to verify directly the factual assumptions on which he chooses to 
base his deductive arguments, provided his empirical conclusions seem to 
be correct. The prevalence o f such a point o f view is, to a large extent, 
responsible for the state o f splendid isolation in which our discipline [ec­
onomics] nowadays finds itself.
W. L e o n tie f ,  E ssay s In  E co n o m ics  278 (1985).
228 Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 644 n.40 (1944) 
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
229 Elsewhere, I have suggested a sensible alternative method o f analyzing antitrust 
disputes. My suggestion relegates economic analysis and other sources o f wisdom for 
antitrust policy to a significant but subsidiary role. The role o f insight from economics 
and other disciplines is to inform the legal process of the implications o f the facts in light 
of the values underlying the law involved. See Flynn, supra note 175; Chaos, supra note 
223.
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is also the source o f the Monsanto Court’s ambivalence concerning 
the continued per se status o f vertical price fixing, the ambiguity 
over what conduct it will classify as price fixing, and what evidence it 
will deem sufficient to prove illegal price fixing. The exclusive use 
of a fixed concept o f restraints upon alienation, followed by exclu­
sive reliance on the neoclassical analytic model to sort out conflict in 
the rights o f buyers, sellers, and consumers is not the sole root of  
the problem. More fundamentally, the courts have adopted a 
mechanical methodology for analyzing antitrust disputes whatever 
the rules and the underlying normative assumptions. At one ex­
treme is the fixed methodology o f per se analysis, reasoning deduc­
tively from a fixed rule applied to an everchanging reality. At the 
other extreme is the undefined analytical methodology o f the rule of 
reason, proceeding inductively without defined standards or mean­
ingful guidelines for the decision maker. A more appropriate meth­
odology combines these positivist and ad hoc realist extremes. 
Courts must use a methodology capable o f incorporating and 
weighing all o f the congressionally mandated antitrust policy goals, 
in light of the facts involved in the dispute and the insights provided 
by a multiplicity o f relevant disciplines.
Courts should view the per se and rule o f reason methods pri­
marily as a single method o f analysis, regarding them as evidentiary 
rules establishing presumptions and burdens of proof rather than as 
hard and fast substantive rules to be rigidly applied. The Court has, 
in fact, sometimes followed this better form of analysis.230 With this 
method, courts use presumptions as tools for investigating the ac­
tual facts o f cases and the assumptions underlying the relevant 
rules. Such an approach recognizes the dynamic interaction o f fact
230 See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board o f Regents o f the Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (“Indeed, there is often no bright line separating per 
se from Rule o f Reason analysis.”); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984) (analyzing competitive impact under both per se and reasonableness standards); 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (“This per se
rule is a valid and useful tool o f antitrust policy and enforcement___ But easy labels do
not always supply ready answers.”) (footnotes omitted); National Soc’y o f Professional 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (“In either event, the purpose o f the 
analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance o f the restraint. . . . ”).
Even in the case o f “hard core” per se violations there can be considerable litiga­
tion over whether the conduct is pursuant to a contract, combination, or conspiracy, see 
United States v. Container Corp. o f Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v. Socony- 
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), whether the conduct is within the per se category, 
see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa 
County Medical Soc’y, 457 U.S. 3'32 (1982), or whether there should be some justifica­
tion for conduct which rebuts the presumption o f per se illegality, see Southern Motor 
Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Broadcast Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Soc’y o f Professional 
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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and law, and how that interaction determines what ought to be done 
in a particular case.
This method o f analyzing vertical restraints justifies a relatively 
strong presumption o f illegality in vertical price fixing cases. Such 
conduct impairs a central goal o f antitrust policy—the indepen­
dence o f traders to set their own price and the concomitant public 
interest in receiving the benefit of one’s individual effort. In unu­
sual cases, such as where joint effort is necessary to produce a prod­
uct, some form of government regulation requires coercive or 
collective action to affect pricing or the circumstances indicate that 
the competitive process cannot work, some justification or excuse 
may warrant a defense to the general rule. Normally, however, the 
Court should adopt a relatively strong presumption against vertical 
price fixing, particularly where a seller’s legitimate goals may be 
achieved by less restrictive means.231
The Court should establish a similarly strong presumption of 
illegality when faced with vertically induced refusals to deal, as in 
Malley-Duff & Associates,232 even where the refusal to deal is not asso­
ciated with price fixing. Such conduct denies the victim of the re­
straint the right to succeed or fail under the regime o f a competitive 
process, as well as the right to be free from others’ unreasonable 
and unjustified conspiracies in the enjoyment of property and con­
tract rights. To suggest that plaintiffs in such cases should be left to 
their state tort remedies is no answer. Reliance on state remedies 
denies congressionally mandated antitrust goals and frustrates Con­
gress’s intention to create federal restrictions against restraints 
of trade.233 The suggestion that the antitrust laws “protect competi­
tion and not competitors” similarly misses the mark; it is a meaning­
less cliche that assumes the answer in its concept o f  
‘ ‘ competition. ”234
231 See Comanor, supra note 204 , at 1001 (advocating strict standards against vertical 
restraints in context of established products); Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An 
Essay on Vertical Restrictions and Consumer Information, 67 Io w a  L. Rev. 981 (1982) (sug­
gesting alternative solutions to free rider problem that would meet economic objectives 
without changing general mle disfavoring vertical restraints).
232 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & As- 
socs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); see supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
233  See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), 
modified. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
234 Here the concept o f “competition” is defined as promoting consumer welfare 
without concern for the rights of competitors Congress intended to protect by guaran­
teeing a competitive process. A counter-cliche suggests itself: “You can not have com­
petition without competitors.” Another favorite and meaningless cliche in antitrust is: 
“Bigness isn’t necessarily bad,” countered by “Bigness isn’t necessarily good.” Cliches 
are not only meaningless, but are often also dangerously misleading if relied upon for 
justification of their unstated conclusions.
The concept that the antitrust laws “protect competition and not competitors” as­
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The Court should subject other vertical restraints to a less con­
clusive presumption of illegality. In some circumstances, a vertical 
customer, location, or territorial restraint may produce public bene­
fits or be of such significance to a seller and its product that the 
presumption in favor of other private and public rights should yield 
to the public good achieved by allowing the restraint. For example, 
the need for new entry into an otherwise concentrated market, for 
protection of public health and safety, or for the provision of neces­
sary repair or warranty services to the public by the least restrictive 
means may justify the imposition of customer, location, or territorial 
restraints in some circumstances.235 The facts of these individual 
cases, in light of the values underlying the antitrust laws, should de­
termine the “ought” of the rules in light of the “is” before the 
court.
Where applying the rule of reason to a case is appropriate, how­
ever, the analysis should not normally require proof o f a relevant 
market and market power. Many lower courts have unthinkingly ap­
plied this requirement in rule o f reason cases,236 but the leading
sumes that protecting competitors is necessarily inconsistent with competition. This 
idea operates on an erroneous assumption about the congressionally mandated goals of 
antitrust policy and indulges in an assumption which contains the either/or fallacy that 
there are only two choices in evaluating vertical market restraints: they are either wholly 
pro-competitive or wholly anti-competitive.
The either/or fallacy indulged in by proponents of an exclusive reliance on neoclas­
sical analysis is dictated by their assumption o f perfect competition. While a particular 
figure in Euclidian geometry may be either a square or not a square because it can not be 
both things at once given the closed definitional system, the messy world of reality often 
presents us with situations of a dual character. This is particularly true o f economic 
activity and its interaction with public policy where the meaning o f rules shifts in light o f  
the changes in what we call facts; where our words articulating rules to govern reality as 
we understand it evolve in light o f changes in our ideology; and where the insights of 
different disciplines adds to or detracts from our understanding o f reality. A legal pro­
cess suffers from a dangerous hardening o f the arteries when it permits itself to be cap­
tured by an “either/or” mentality and lets the meaning o f the normative objectives of 
the law become frozen to serve the unexamined ideological preferences o f a decision 
maker. See supra note 182.
235 See Comanor, supra note 204, at 1001-02 (discussing new entry); Levmore, supra 
note 231, at 982-83 (discussing safety and new entry).
236 See, e.g., Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); General Leaseways, 
Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984); Oreck Corp. v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). But see Malley 
Duff & Assocs. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, Agency Hold­
ing Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 
1986), Judge Bork held that the plaintiff must prove a relevant market and power in that 
market in a § 1 horizontal restraint case analyzed under the rule o f reason. Id. at 229. 
Rothery is likely to become the leading case advocating this position, as well as the posi­
tion that group boycotts are not per se illegal. Although the court below, Rothery Stor­
age & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 792 F.2d 
210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), decided the case on other grounds, Judge Bork used the opportu­
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Supreme Court rule o f reason cases do not mandate this ap­
proach.237 Courts which require this showing implicitly assume the 
narrow antitrust policy goals o f neoclassical economic analysis and 
consequently are captured by its rigid definition o f “competition.” 
In addition to the model’s problems with congressional intent and 
its self-serving definition o f competition, discussed above, this re­
quirement converts a Sherman Act section 1 case into a Sherman 
Act section 2 case by focusing on structure rather than behavior in 
conflict with the statute’s language and meaning.238 The require­
ment thus makes impractical the effective litigation o f cases where 
legitimate claims o f unreasonableness should be evaluated by the 
courts.
The classic statement of the rule of reason in Chicago Board of 
Trade v. United States239 contained no requirement that the plaintiff 
prove a relevant market and power or an injury in a defined relevant 
market. The “rule o f reason” instead requires a court to examine 
several factors: the peculiarities o f the trade or industry involved, 
the power o f the participants to the restraint, the horizontal or verti­
cal nature of the restraint, the purpose and effect o f the restraint, 
the public and private benefits and detriments of the restraint, and 
the availability of less restrictive alternatives to avoid the plan’s det­
riments and achieve its benefits.240 Although an evaluation of the
nity to assert his unsubstantiated position that the sole goal of antitrust is to insure 
economic “efficiency” as defined by the neoclassical model. Not surprisingly, Judge 
Bork therefore concluded a restraint must be shown to injure competition in a relevant 
market before it can be found unreasonable; likewise, proof o f power in a relevant mar­
ket is required in order to show an injury to competition. 792 F.2d at 229. The opinion 
thus blurs the distinction between § 1 and § 2 o f the Sherman Act by converting § 1 
analysis into a structural analysis rather than a conduct analysis. After Rolhery, it is diffi­
cult to see what significance § 1 o f the Sherman Act has as an antitrust prohibition dis­
tinct from § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act.
237 See FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986); NCAA v. Board of 
Regents o f the Univ. o f Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); National Soc’y o f Professional Eng’rs 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Regents of the Univ. o f Cal. v. American Broad­
casting Co., 747 F.2d 511 (1984).
238 See supra n o te  236.
239 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
240 See generally L . S c h w a r tz ,  J. F ly n n , & H. F i r s t ,  supra n o te  176, a t 351-54 (dis­
cussing  ru le  o f  reaso n  analysis). Such  an  analytic p ro cess  is ana lo g o u s to  th e  b alan cin g  
pro cess  follow ed in  d o rm a n t co m m erce  c lause cases, w here  th e  co urts ex am ine benefits , 
d e tr im en ts , p u rp o se , effect, less restric tiv e  alternatives, an d  o th e r  facto rs in  assessing  
th e  s ta te  an d  fed era l in te re s ts  involved. B o th  in q u iries  re q u ire  a b alan cin g  p ro cess  sen ­
sitive to  th e  facts o f  specific cases a n d  th e  n o rm ativ e  values u n d erly in g  th e  ad o p tio n  o f  
th e  co m m erce clause o r  th e  a n ti tru s t laws, as th e  case m ay b e . R ig id  fo rm u lae  o r labels 
m asking  th e  u n d erly in g  reaso n s  fo r th e  dec ision  se ld om  w ork fo r lo n g  b ecau se  they  fail 
to  iden tify  th e  po lic ies involved o r  to  analyze all o f  th e  facts in lig h t o f  th e  re levan t 
polic ies. F o r  a survey o f  th e  ev o lu tio n  o f  th e  C o u rt’s ro le  in  app ly ing  th e  d o rm a n t com ­
m erce  c lause from  m echanical fo rm u lae  th ro u g h  u n ex p la in ed  labe ls to  a b alan cin g  p ro ­
cess, see  G . G u n th e r ,  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Law  231-317  (1 1th ed . 1985). A n titru s t analysis 
u n d e r  § 1 o f  th e  S herm an  Act ap p e ars  to  b e  stuck in  th e  19th cen tu ry  m o d e  o f  m echan i­
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relevant market and a party’s power in that market may be relevant 
in some circumstances to evaluate adequately the restraint’s effect 
or its benefits or detriments, such an evaluation is clearly not man­
dated in all cases by either Supreme Court precedent or antitrust 
legislation.
Furthermore, analysis o f the relevant market and market power 
cannot form a necessary element in most vertical restraint cases. 
The issues in most cases involve a balancing o f the property and 
contract rights and rationalities of plaintiff and defendant in light of  
the antitrust law’s multiple goals, the benefits the public is entitled 
to receive from reliance upon a competitive process, the facts, and 
the insights o f disciplines (including empirically based insights from 
economics) which may serve to inform the legal process. Require­
ments to the contrary, like those contained in the Department of  
Justice’s “Vertical Restraints Guidelines,”241 subvert the purposes 
of the antitrust laws, misconstrue the law applicable to vertical re­
straints and the reality in which they occur, and mislead the unwary 
as to the elements o f a rule o f reason case. The House of Repre­
sentatives has gone to the trouble o f expressly repudiating the so- 
called “Guidelines” because they are inconsistent with the congres­
sional purpose in adopting the antitrust laws.242 The courts should 
also repudiate the Guidelines as inconsistent with the function o f a 
judicial process that must apply Congress’s policies in enforcing the 
antitrust laws. Furthermore, they are inconsistent with the judicial 
process in that they impose a wooden methodology without regard 
for the normative values Congress established through the antitrust 
laws. Finally, the guidelines prevent proper consideration o f the 
facts o f individual cases by imposing a set o f narrow, unrealistic, and 
frozen assumptions from another era.
cal formulae and labels like “per se,” “rule o f reason,” “efficiency,” “relevant market,” 
and so on.
241 50 Fed Reg. 6263 (Feb. 14, 1985); see 5 T r a d e  R eg . R ep. (CCH) 50,473 (analyz­
ing guidelines); A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  R eg . R ep. (BNA) N o. 1199, at 193 (Jan. 24, 1985) 
(same). The National Association o f Attorneys General has adopted vertical guidelines 
which depart siguificantly from those o f the federal government. See State Attorneys 
General Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 5 T r a d e  R eg . Rep. (CCH) 50,478; NAAG Adopts 
Alternative Guidelines to Govern Vertical Restraints o f Trade, [July-Dee.] A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  
R e g . Rep. (BNA) No. 1243, at 978, 996 (Dec. 5, 1985).
242  h .R. Res. 303, 99th Cong., 1st Sess, 131 C o n g . R e c . HI 1390, HI 1391 (daily ed. 
Dec. 9, 1985) (stating that Guidelines “(1) are not an accurate expression o f the Federal 
antitrust laws or of congressional intent with regard to the application of such laws . . . ;  
(2) shall not be accorded any force of law or be treated by the courts o f the United States 
as binding or persuasive; and (3) should be recalled by the Attorney General”); see also 
H.R. Rep. N o. 399, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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C o n c l u s io n
One cannot survey the post -Monsanto litigation without con­
cluding that the law is presently in a state of disarray. There is con­
fusion with respect to the sufficiency of evidence to send a case to 
the jury on the issue of conspiracy, the proper elements of “price 
fixing,” the distinction (and the purpose of drawing a distinction) 
between horizontal and vertical restraints, and whether courts 
should presume vertically imposed territorial and customer re­
straints lawful in most circumstances. At a more basic level, the 
courts are ideologically confused over the purpose and goals of anti­
trust laws. This state o f affairs has not only generated uncertainty 
and excessive litigation, but has also spawned a widespread move­
ment to regulate vertical market restraints through an array o f com­
plex federal and state franchising laws.243 These laws attempt to 
respond to the perceived failure of antitrust policy to account for all 
the interests and values wrapped up in vertical market restraints 
through flexible and realistic analytical methodology. The laws thus 
reflect dissatisfaction with the courts’ growing allegiance to a nar­
row ideology and methodology which offers a false coherence, pre­
dictability, and certainty.
Judicial reliance upon the neoclassical model provides a false 
coherence because it ignores the congressional goals o f antitrust 
policy and the legal process’s methodology and purpose. This reli­
ance creates a false predictability because it depends exclusively 
upon an abstract model of a world which does not exist and pre­
cludes courts from grappling with the reality of the disputes anti­
trust policy is committed to resolve. Finally, this reliance creates a 
false certainty because it fails to account for the long-term conse­
quences o f its assumptions. The legal process and antitrust policy 
cannot escape a constant confrontation between the values underly­
ing the assumptions behind their rules and methodology, evolving 
reality, and normative values. Sooner or later, reality and the logic
243 T h e  grow ing  list o f  federal a n d  s ta te  special franch ise  laws h ave b ee n  ad o p te d  in 
lig h t o f  th e  fa ilu re  o f  a n ti tru s t policy to  dea l constructively  w ith th e  reality  o f  franch ise  
re la tio n sh ip s generally , as well as characteristics o f  fran ch isin g  n o t read ily  co n tro lled  by 
an titru s t policy (e.g., f rau d  in th e  sa le  o f  franch ises re q u ir in g  d isc lo su re  reg u la tio n ). 
O v er th e  p as t 10 years th e re  h as b ee n  a  g rad u al in crease  in  special fran ch ise  legislation  
c o rre sp o n d in g  to  th e  g rad u al d ec rease  in th e  use  o f  a n ti tru s t policy to  reg u la te  vertical 
m arket re la tio n sh ip s. In  so m e instances, special fran ch ise  reg u la tio n  ap p e ars  to  b e  p o ­
tentially  in ju rio u s to  co m p etitio n  a n d  th e  co m petitive  p ro cess. See L. S c h w a r tz ,  J. 
F ly n n  & H . F i r s t ,  supra n o te  176, a t 782-97 (surveying fed era l a n d  s ta te  franch ise  s ta t­
u tes  ap p a ren tly  b ase d  on  co n cern  fo r  p ro tec tin g  franch isees ra th e r  th an  com petitive  
process); see also B rau n , Policy Issues of Franchising; 14 Sw. U.L. Rev. 155 (1984) (general 
survey o f  g row th  o f  fran ch ise  reg u la tio n ); Faruki, The Defense of Terminated Dealer Litiga­
tion: A Survey of Legal and Strategic Considerations, 46 O h io  S t .  L.J. 925 (1985) (sam e).
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of legal analysis must be given their due. Courts and scholars pre­
tending otherwise only postpone the reckoning and aggravate its 
price.
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